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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
he consumer credit market depends on the exchange of personal information 
among market participants. Credit bureaus are the primary repositories of this 
information, and in recent years they have gathered a vast amount of data on 
creditworthiness of individuals. Currently Europe as well as the United States are 
planning large-scale overhauls of their regimes of information sharing in consumer credit 
markets. In Europe, a new proposal for a directive on consumer credit is discussed, 
whereas in the US, key provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act are expiring by the 
end of 2003.  
Until recently, however, there has been little independent research on the far-reaching 
implications of privacy regulations in consumer credit markets. There has also been little 
quantitative analysis of the effects of differing regulatory environments on both credit 
reporting agencies and the efficiency of the consumer credit market. The present study 
fills that gap by analysing the economic effects associated with different financial privacy 
regimes. The US are contrasted with the European Union (with Germany, Great Britain 
and France as reference countries) to analyse the differences in the privacy regimes and 
their effects on consumer credit markets. There are less privacy regulations in the US 
and credit bureaus compete on a nationwide scale. In the EU, on the other hand, data 
protection and credit reporting schemes differ from one country to another. Americans 
enjoy broad access to credit, but this is correlated with greater indebtedness, whereas in 
the EU, credit markets are thinner and households are in general less indebted. 
One of the major research questions is whether more stringent data protection 
regulations inhibit the distribution of credit reports in consumer credit markets. This, in 
turn, could result in reduced access to credit, less integrated markets and increasing 
consumer credit risk (measured by the household debt-service burden). With the 
Financial Privacy Index (FPI) developed in this study, it is possible to quantify data 
protection regimes. The indices show that the US grants less data protection than the 
reviewed EU members. Using this index, it is possible to identify the effects of data 
protection on information distribution, access to credit, consumer indebtedness and 
consumer credit risk. 
The international comparison shows that countries with higher data protection exhibit 
lower information allocation. However, growing data protection in individual countries is 
correlated with increased information allocation. It is shown that the more credit reports 
are sold the higher is the access to credit. This is associated with greater consumer 
indebtedness and higher consumer credit risk. Among other factors, the latter is due to 
T ii 
the fact that access is broadened and marginally less creditworthy households are 
entering the market. 
The policy implications are the following. To increase access to credit and to expand the 
integration of the consumer credit markets in the EU, cross-border dissemination of 
credit reports should be facilitated by a standardisation of European credit reporting 
systems. The proposal for a new directive on consumer credit provides a chance for such 
harmonisation. At the same time, however, this exchange has to be transparent to 
consumers – this is of the utmost importance for the trust in consumer credit markets.  
Moreover, the European Commission should ensure that the current Data Protection 
Directive is equally and quickly transposed in the member countries. A new directive 
directed specifically to the exchange of credit information would only increase regulatory 
uncertainty and introduce another round of extended and unequal transposition efforts by 
member countries. In addition, the European Commission should develop a transparent 
evaluation mechanism for reviewing the transposition and operation of the current Data 
Protection Directive.  
In the US, where the Fair Credit Reporting Act is currently discussed, policy-makers 
should ensure that the national standards in credit reporting are kept in place. To some 
extend, the US faces the same problems as Europe. If states are allowed to design their 
own regulations for information sharing regimes, these regimes will almost certainly 
differ and therefore reduce scale and scope effects in the credit reporting industry. Credit 
reporting markets are based upon networks and these networks exhibit peculiarities that 
should be taken into consideration before applying regulations. The present study also 
describes the competition in such markets.  
A unified system of credit reporting in Europe is likely to result in broader access to 
consumer credit. And cross-border credit, which is still in its infancy in Europe, may also 
increase. However, with the broader access seems to come increasing consumer credit 
risk, as the analysis of the present study suggests. Intensified competition in consumer 
credit markets is certainly increasing the quality of services and decreasing prices in the 
long run, but currently Europe does not seem to have adequate instruments in place to 
monitor the development of the market. Therefore, the EU also needs common 
definitions and procedures of bankruptcy and over-indebtedness of households to 
effectively monitor these developments. 
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1. Introduction 
Credit markets have changed remarkably in the 1990s due to increasing liberalisation and 
the widespread adoption of information technology. The intermediating mechanisms of 
information-sharing in these markets, however, have largely developed without major 
discussion in the public realm. In recent years the information allocation mediated via 
credit bureaus has attracted increasing interest and currently the European Union as well 
as the United States plan reforms of the regulation of information sharing in their 
consumer credit markets. Data protection regulation of this information exchange, 
however, and especially its economic implications for consumer credit markets have not 
been analysed to date.  
The present study is intended to close this gap by analysing the economic effects of 
different financial privacy regimes on consumer credit markets. It also provides evidence 
about the costs of financial data protection. In this study, the US and the EU (with 
Germany, Great Britain and France as reference countries) are contrasted. Broadly, the 
US provides less data protection than does the EU. On both sides of the Atlantic, 
however, major changes in data protection occurred in the 1990s due to increasing 
public pressure for more data protection. Moreover, in the EU the new proposal for a 
directive on consumer credit mandates new obligations in this respect and in the US key 
provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act are currently under review, since they expire 
by the end of 2003.  
In this study, it is examined whether more stringent privacy regimes portend adverse 
effects for the distribution of consumer credit reports in credit markets. This could result 
in reduced access to consumer credit and increasing credit risk (measured by the 
household debt-service burden), since information on the characteristics of the borrower 
is not readily available.  
First the differences in data protection regimes in the countries of interest are discussed. 
The Financial Privacy Index developed in this study is a quantitative measure that rates 
countries according to the protection of personal credit information that is distributed via 
credit bureaus. This index is supposed to show the differences in a more detailed way 
than the studies that have been conducted in this field so far. Moreover, the approach has 
the great strength of showing a dynamic perspective, since the countries are rated for the 
whole decade (1990-2001).  
The index is then introduced in the statistical tests to analyse adverse effects of increased 
data protection on information distribution, access to credit, consumer indebtedness or 
consumer credit risk. The picture is completed by a discussion of the competition in 
credit reporting industries, which are prone to strong concentration processes. Again, 
large differences in the US-EU comparison can be found. Competition in the European NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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credit reporting industry only recently started to intensify, but credit bureaus still primary 
concentrate on their national markets. Their US counterparts, on the other hand, 
compete on an international scale and entered the EU markets via mergers and 
acquisitions.  
It is not the purpose of this study to choose one of the privacy regimes as a benchmark 
or as a first-best solution. Instead both positive and negative consequences are examined 
since they are associated with each of the different financial privacy regimes. 
2. Financial Privacy Regimes and Their Evaluation  
Data protection regimes differ widely from country to country – a fact that constitutes 
problems not only for international data transfers, but that also led to a dispute between 
the US and the EU from 1998 until 2000 over what constitutes adequate protection of 
personal information. In what way those countries differ is largely unknown, however, 
because this involves an analysis and comparison of laws. 
First the data protection regime of the aforementioned countries are described (US, 
Germany, Great Britain and France). In addition, the European level is included which 
constitutes the harmonisation framework. This descriptive part already hints at the 
existing gaps and differences, although a more thorough analysis is given in a later 
section.  
2.1 The Evolution of Financial Privacy Regimes in the 1990s 
Over the last 30 years, one could observe the emergence of international agreements that 
include a subgroup of countries or whole regions, depending on the number of signatory 
countries. These regimes offer minimum standards of privacy protection on an 
international level and sometimes also serve as an example for national legislation. In an 
ideal case, a country could choose to adopt the principles of one of the three 
international regimes currently in operation: that of the OECD, the EEC or the EU.
1  
Such regimes vary in the protection they grant to the individual. An important point is 
that they are very different in their institutional form; some are simple voluntary 
guidelines, while others are binding international contracts. One may state that these 
regimes reveal regulatory discrepancies, in the sense that one country may apply very 
strict rules, while another may not have any in effect at all. Moreover, if countries have 
no data protection laws, nor signed any of the international agreements, this could give 
rise to “off-shore data havens”.  
The more stringent regimes, on the other hand, are accused of acting as non-tariff trade 
barriers to the free flow of information, especially for service industries (Kitchenman and 
Teixeira, 1998, p. 104 and p. 106).  
                                                 
1 The 1980 OECD guidelines were intended as a recommendation for a harmonisation of national 
regimes. They are based on eight principles: collection limitation, data quality, purpose specification, 
usage limitation, security safeguards, openness, individual participation (access) and accountability. We 
evaluate only the EEC and the EU regime.  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
 3 
Table 1 presents an overview of the acts that are important for regulating the collection 
and distribution of creditworthiness information. It only includes the federal acts in the 
four countries of interest, not the regulatory measures. This simple overview already 
shows how often data protection regimes change. The US introduces new regulations on 
the federal level with greater frequency than do European countries. This, of course, not 
only depends on the efficiency of the legislative institutions, but also on the distribution 
of information technologies and the public pressure that arises with large-scale 
information collection and processing. 
Table 1. Financial privacy regimes in the four selected countries and in the EU 
  Acts 
United States  1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act 
  1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
  1992 Fair Credit Reporting Act (as amended)*  
  1996 Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act  
  1999 Fair Credit Reporting Act (as amended)*  
  1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
European Union   1981 CEC (Treaty 108/81) Convention for the Protection of Individuals 
with regards to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
  1995 95/46/EC Directive on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data  
Germany   1977 Federal Data Protection Act 
  1990 Federal Data Protection Act 
  1994 Amendment to the Federal Data Protection Act  
  2001 Amendment to the Federal Data Protection Act 
Great Britain  1974 Consumer Credit Act  
  1984 Data Protection Act  
  1998 Data Protection Act  
France   1978 Act on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties 
  1989 Neiertz Act  
*The 1992 Act includes earlier amendments. In 1998, the Consumer Reporting Employment 
Clarification Act amended the 1992 FCRA. 
 
2.1.1 The US Financial Privacy Regimes in the 1990s 
The US is generally characterised as a country that is more market-oriented than other 
countries. This induces the observation that the US might change its regulations more 
often, but in general, less obligations are posed upon companies. Historically, this might 
be attributed to the deeply rooted suspicion with which Americans regard government 
interference.  
Credit reporting was not regulated at the federal level until 1970, but today this industry 
is among the most regulated in the US in the area of data protection. The following NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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assessment includes laws that establish the regulation of information flows specifically in 
credit reporting.
2  
In the United States, the regulation of consumer credit information is mainly based upon 
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) of 1970 and its amendments in the 1990s. The 
FCRA established permissible purposes of credit information disclosure and formally 
codified the information flows as they had already developed in the market. The Act also 
introduced dispute settlement mechanisms as well as correction procedures to increase 
information quality. Finally, it assigned certain life cycles to derogatory and bankruptcy 
information. The already existent information-sharing arrangements were largely left 
unaffected by the Act, since a change in information flows could have caused disruptions 
in the consumer credit market that depends on such flows. Several other information 
transactions were left unregulated also, i.e. information flows among data providers and 
credit bureaus and affiliates as well as among non-affiliates that buy and sell credit 
reports. This regime was amended after 1995 in a substantive way. Further explanations 
of the early regime are provided by Azcuenaga (1991), Federal Trade Commission 
(1972), Maurer and Thomas (1997) and Waren (1993).  
The regime as described has not been altered in a general way for more than 25 years. 
The 1990s, however, brought major reforms that were intended to close the loopholes, 
strengthen privacy rights and improve the data quality of credit reporting information. 
These acts have primarily been enacted in response to consumer complaints and an 
intensifying public debate about privacy erosion in the face of increasing use of 
information technologies. For the second part of the 1990s, the following acts were 
analysed: Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 (1996 CCRRA), the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act of 1999 (1999 FCRA) and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
(1999 GLBA).
 3 
The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act of 1996 introduced a new information 
network requiring a notification system among credit bureaus in the event that 
inaccuracies occurred. For the first time, it also introduced duties for information 
providers. It mandated an information flow to credit bureaus in order to correct any 
inaccuracies as well as a reciprocal flow from the bureaus to the furnishers for the same 
reason. The Act also facilitated an increase in the information flows among affiliates of 
the same corporate family. Those affiliates are allowed to share information, but only 
after they notified the consumer and provided him or her with an opportunity to opt-out. 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 completed the picture in regulating the 
information flows among financial institutions and non-affiliated third parties. 
Information may be shared after the provision of a notice and an opt-out opportunity. 
While flows among financial institutions and third parties can be interrupted by 
consumers (through opt-out), the information network with credit bureaus has been 
exempted from this rule – the consumer has to be informed about the sharing 
arrangement, but only in the case of an adverse decision based upon the credit report. 
                                                 
2 Some states in the US provide higher data protection in their state laws. For purposes of comparability, 
however, we only evaluated the federal acts.  
3 Some of these acts have been amended. For instance, the FCRA of 1999 has been amended by the 
CCRRA of 1996 and the Consumer Reporting Employment Clarification Act of 1998.  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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Reviewed within the US context, these rules may represent a stricter regulation 
especially in notification and correction provisions. Compared to Europe, however, the 
picture seems to be one of relatively free access to information and market-mediated 
information accumulation and distribution. For further explanations, the reader is 
referred to Barr and Ellis (1999), Federal Trade Commission (1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 
2001, 2002), Fischer and McEneney (1997), Perine (2001) and Swire (1996).  
Currently, the FCRA is under review in the US. Certain key provisions of the act expire 
by 1 January 2004. This is the case for the national standards provision as passed in 
1996, which pre-empts state legislatures from regulating specific aspects of consumer 
reporting (for instance, the right to share information with affiliates).  
Congress, therefore, must re-authorise the state pre-emption provisions; otherwise, 
states could apply their own regulatory approach. In that case, problems could arise 
resembling those in Europe in which different regulatory regimes could affect the 
competition in the credit reporting industry, which would no longer be subject to a 
nationally unified framework. Since the competition in the credit reporting industry is 
based upon networks that reveal strong scale and scope effects, regulatory measures 
should take such effects into account. As of June 2003, a series of hearings on this issue 
were scheduled.
4  
2.1.2 The EU and Member State Financial Privacy Regimes in the 1990s 
2.1.2.1 The EU Harmonisation Regime 
Data protection has changed enormously in the EU over the course of the 1990s. This is 
largely due to the increasing integration of the European member states, some of which 
are still in the process of transposing the Data Protection Directive. Moreover, in 2003, a 
proposal for a new directive on consumer credit is discussed that also has some 
implications for credit reporting systems (see also Jentzsch 2003a).
5  
The early data protection regime at the EU level is based on the Council of Europe 
Convention that was introduced in 1981.
6 It is a regime that was intended to harmonise 
minimum requirements in data protection and to strengthen cross-national cooperation 
among data protection authorities in Europe.  
It does not include specific regulations for industries and therefore one cannot directly 
find any specific rules about credit reporting. However, since credit bureaus fall under 
these general provisions, the Convention is included to summarise the protection at the 
European level before 1995. There are also other general rules at the EU level, such as 
Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and Art. 286 EC of the 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. These rules are very basic and mainly echo the Convention. 
                                                 
4 Position papers and statements are available on the House Committee on Financial Services website 
(http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=213). 
5 The full title of the proposed directive is: Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the Harmonisation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States 
concerning Credit for Consumers.  
6 The full title is: Council of Europe Convention (Treaty 108/81): Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (CEC).  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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It had to be implemented by the contracting parties, which included Germany, Great 
Britain and France.  
The Convention is the first binding international instrument in the field of data 
protection. The signatory countries are required to take necessary steps to legislatively 
implement the principles. These principles protect individuals against abuses that may 
arise with the increasing use of information technologies and the collection and 
processing of personal data. At the same time, the Convention was intended to regulate 
the transborder flow of personal data and strengthen cooperation among data protection 
officers. There are several rights to information that are granted to the data subject, for 
example, the right to know that information is stored, and if necessary, to have it 
corrected. By 2002, the Convention entered into force in 27 European states (Council of 
Europe, 2002). Further explanations in this case are provided by Council of Europe 
(2001a, 2001b, 2002), Madsen (1992), Mellors and Pollitt (1984) and Reidenberg and 
Schwartz (1996).  
In 1995, the European Data Protection Directive was enacted.
7 This is by far the most 
important regulation introduced at the EU level concerning data protection and it also is 
the most comprehensive one in terms of rights and obligations. Although it is commonly 
assumed that the directive is a minimum standard, this is not the case. The regulation is 
primarily supposed to harmonise the regimes, not to minimise data protection. The 
Directive is a major example of the increasing integration depth in the EU. The Directive 
was set out to establish an equivalent level of lawful data processing preconditions, data 
subject rights and administrative practises. It has to be noted that the Directive only 
regulates activities that fall under the scope of EU law. “It excludes areas within Titles V 
and VI of the Treaty on European Union, public safety, defence, state security (…) and 
the activities of the state in areas of criminal law.” (Carey and Russell, 2000, p. 5). To 
fully understand the European regime it was necessary to include Boehmer (2000) and 
Brühann (1998, 2000) as well as various documents of the European Commission (1997, 
1998a, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002) in the analysis. 
In 2002, the proposed directive on consumer credit revealed the increased awareness of 
the importance of credit reporting. The proposal was initiated to achieve an optimal 
harmonisation level for an integrated European consumer credit market, which is still 
largely fragmented into national markets (see Jentzsch, 2003a). Another purpose of the 
Directive is to increase consumer protection, which is supposed to be achieved by a new 
symmetry of information and responsibility of creditor and borrower.  
In Arts. 7 and 8, the proposal also has implications for credit reporting. It states that 
personal data may only be collected for the purpose of evaluating creditworthiness and 
that it should be destroyed immediately after. Art. 8 states that member states shall 
ensure the operation of a central negative credit registry and that creditors are obliged to 
consult the data base. It is left open for member states, if they want to go beyond such a 
negative registry and also establish a positive one. Creditors, however, will be required 
                                                 
7 In the following, we quote the official version of the Directive as published in the Official Journal 
(1995). The full title is: 95/46/EC Directive on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data (Directive 95/46/EC).  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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to consult the data base before granting credit. The discussion over this proposal 
intensified in the first half of 2003.  
2.1.2.2 The German Financial Privacy Regime 
Germany has been the leading country in the field of data protection; the first codified 
data protection law in the world was enacted in the state of Hesse in 1970. The law 
assigned the enforcement authority to an independent data protection commissioner and 
served as example for the federal law. Seven years later, in 1977, the first Federal Data 
Protection Act was enacted, which established the federal data protection authority 
(Bundesbeauftragter für Datenschutz) and granted specific rights to data subjects, such 
as access, rectification, blocking or erasure of data. The laws in the individual states 
(Bundesländer) had to be amended after 1983, the year the federal Supreme Court ruled 
in the census case that citizens have a right to “informational self-determination.”
8 This 
section recounts the most important German laws in this area.  
In 1990, the German government adopted the Federal Data Protection Act 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz), which was amended in 1994. For the first half of the 1990s, 
the Federal Data Protection Act of 1990 (1990 FDPA) and the Amendment of the 
Federal Data Protection Act in 1994 (1994 AFDPA) are analysed. 
The history of the German data protection laws has been described by Lutterbeck (1998) 
who states that there have been three phases. As stated, the first Federal Data Protection 
Act provided a common ground for the individual states. It followed a comprehensive 
approach in applying to the private and public entities at the same time. The second 
phase began in 1990, when the Data Protection Act had to be amended to bring it in line 
with the census case of the German Supreme Court. Finally, the third phase started with 
the Data Protection Directive. As secondary legislation and further literature 
Bundesbeauftragter für Datenschutz (1998, 1999, 2002), European Commission (1998c, 
pp. 30-38), Madsen (1992), Mitrou (1993) and Weber (1986) are included in the 
analysis.  
The transposition of the EU Directive in Germany followed two steps: the first was 
intended to implement the essential adjustments, while the second was to establish a 
comprehensive overhaul of the data protection laws (European Commission, 1999, p. 6). 
In May 2001, the new Federal Data Protection Act of 2001 went into effect, marking the 
first step in the implementation of EU law. In the aftermath of the Act, six German states 
adopted new privacy protection laws.
9 Due to the harmonisation at EU level, various 
amendments had been introduced at the national level in the member states, which is the 
case in Germany. The recent modifications of the German data protection regime are 
also reviewed. In this respect, especially the Amendment of the Federal Data Protection 
Act of 2001 (2001 AFDPA) is important.
10  
                                                 
8 This means that it is an individual’s decision whenever and to what extent he or she wants to disclose 
personal information.  
9 Brandenburg, Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein.  
10 The German title is Gesetz zur Änderung des Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes und anderer Gesetze. NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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In Germany, creditworthiness data can be used and processed only with written consent 
of the data subject. It is common business practice of credit-granting institutions to 
include a clause in contracts that enables them to transfer positive data to a credit 
register. This is necessary, because in the case of creditworthiness information, the 
“legitimate interest” of the bank covers only the transfer of negative data. For positive 
data, the bank has to obtain the permission of the data subject. Further explanations are 
provided by Bundesbeauftragter für Datenschutz (1998, 1999, 2002) and European 
Commission (1998c, 1999).  
2.1.2.3 The British Financial Privacy Regime 
The debate about privacy legislation in Great Britain started in the early 1970s with a 
report by the Younger Committee. This committee proposed 10 guidelines that were 
intended to provide basic protection of the individual (Carey and Russell, 2000, p. 1). 
The committee proposals were not implemented, but in 1974 major legislation was 
enacted to regulate the consumer credit business. The Consumer Credit Act defined 
consumer credit business broadly and included “ancillary credit businesses,” a category 
that encompasses credit referencing (Goode, 1974, p. 43).  
The act stated that such business activities require a licence, which is normally granted 
for three years and allows the owner to conduct all activities that are described in it. Any 
person engaging in any activities for which a licence is required without holding one 
commits an offence. This is explained in the sections 39.1 and 147.1 of the Consumer 
Credit Act. The Consumer Credit Act established the early regulation of the credit 
reporting business. In 1978, the Lindop Committee published a report that dealt 
specifically with the question of data protection (instead of general privacy as did the 
Younger Committee). In this report it recommended the establishment of a data 
protection authority. However, the British authorities did not react until the Council of 
Europe Convention followed in 1981. Three years later, the Data Protection Act of 1984 
was passed, which transposed the minimum requirements set out in the Convention. The 
Act included eight very broad principles that were not enforceable in courts, but by the 
Data Protection Registrar and the Data Protection Tribunal (Carey and Russell, 2000, p. 
4). As secondary literature, Carey and Russell (2000), European Commission (1998c, 
pp. 17-29), France (1995), Madsen (1992), Goode (1974) are included.  
In Great Britain, there are mainly three laws that govern financial data protection: the 
Consumer Credit Act (1974), the Data Protection Act (1984) and the Data Protection 
Act (1998). The latter transposed the EU Data Protection Directive. It brought 
significant changes to the already very complex legislation in Great Britain. The Data 
Protection Act of 1998 transposes the Directive 95/46/EC by providing new regulations 
of the processing of information relating to individuals, including a notice of purpose of 
the data collection as well as the types of data that are collected (Data Protection Act of 
1998, chap. 29, part II, 7 (1) a, b). This Act is considered to be the new core of privacy 
legislation in Great Britain (European Commission, 1999, p. 8).  
The Act of 1998 also provides “principles of good practice”, in which data have to be 
processed fairly and lawfully and for only limited purposes. In the case of inaccuracies, 
the controller of this data can be mandated to rectify, erase or destroy those data (Data 
Protection Act of 1998, chap. 29, part II, 14 [1]). This is very much in line with the new THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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European Directive. Prior to the Directive, the situation in Great Britain resembled that 
of the US in the sense that no prior consent to data processing was required. Therefore 
the reform introduced new regulations in the field of individual rights, the legitimacy of 
data processing, regulations concerning sensitive data and international data flows.  
Great Britain has a very complex system of enforcement and supervision. For the 1974 
Consumer Credit Act, the Department of Trade and Industry issues regulations, while 
the Office of Fair Trading is obligated to supervise the enforcement. For the Data 
Protection Act of 1998, however, the Home Office issues regulations, while the 
Information Commissioner is the enforcement authority. Concerning the latter act, the 
Home Office, for example, released nearly 20 regulations, which add precision and 
clarify regulatory details (Carey and Russell, 2000, p. 7).
11 As secondary legislation and 
further literature, the Department of Trade and Industry (2000), Home Office (2000) and 
Carey and Russell (2000) are included. Secondary legislation on credit reference 
agencies in Great Britain includes the “Consumer Credit (Conduct of Business) (Credit 
References) Regulations 1977 No. 330” which was amended by the “Consumer Credit 
(Credit Reference Agency) Regulations 2000, No. 290” and the “Consumer Credit 
(Conduct of Business) (Credit References) (Amendment) Regulations 2000, No. 291”. 
The latter was released in March 2000. Other important legislative orders are the ones on 
fees (Nos. 187 and 188), as well as on processing of sensitive personal data (No. 417). 
2.1.2.4 The French Financial Privacy Regime 
France has one of the strictest privacy regimes in Europe, based on the 1978 Act on Data 
Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties. This act created the National 
Commission for Data Processing and Liberties,
12 an independent agency that performs 
advisory and monitoring functions. Companies that process personal information are 
expected to register with the CNIL. The agency also has the power to deny the license 
for data processing (Litan and Swire, 1998, p. 23).  
Regulatory power concerning bankruptcy information, on the other hand, is vested in the 
Banking and Financial Regulatory Committee (Comité de la Réglementation Bancaire et 
Financière, CRBF), a committee that is chaired by the Minister of Economic Affairs and 
Finance and includes the Governor of the Banque de France. This committee releases 
general regulations governing the establishment of data bases on credit and repayment 
(the system is described below in the section on “competition” in France).  
By 2002, France had not implemented the Data Protection Directive. In February 1998, 
the administration issued a report that described the changes in the law, but by October 
of the same year, the Directive should have already been implemented. In 1999, a 
proposal of a modified legislation was sent to the National Parliament. No results 
emerged during the next year, which led the European Commission to initiate a case 
                                                 
11 Moreover, the British credit industry has established the agreement “Information-sharing – Principles 
of Reciprocity” that regulates the sharing of account information via credit referencing. The agreement 
is registered with the Office of Fair Trading. The Standing Committee on Reciprocity (SCOR) oversees 
the sharing arrangement. Despite requests, the author was not able to obtain this document.  
12 We refer to the National Commission for Data Processing and Liberties in its original French title, the 
Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL).  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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before the European Court against France and four other countries that had failed to 
transpose the Directive. The CNIL published its opinion concerning the draft bill in 
September 2000. The National Assembly reviewed the bill, which is intended to 
strengthen the CNIL and to preserve the level of protection granted by the 1978 law, and 
it voted in support of it. After the first reading of the bill, however, the process came to a 
standstill, because of the elections in France. Therefore, only the Act 78-17 of January 
1978 on Data Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties of 1978 (1978 DPDFIL)
13 
and the Neiertz Act of 1989 (1989 NA) are included.  
Rules and secondary legislation in France are included in Table 2 below. Moreover, two 
resolutions of the CNIL are of special interest to us: “Déliberation No. 88-83” 
(recommendation concerning the administration of information on borrowers as well as 
the right to access and duration of storage) and the “Déliberation No. 98-101” 
(Modification of the 88-83 resolution concerning the variable of nationality in scoring 
systems) by the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés (1988, 1998a, 
1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001).  
Table 2. Regulation of the French FICP 
Year  Title of Regulation  File 
1986  Règlement No. 86-08 du 27 février 1986 relatif à la centralisation des incidents de 
paiement  
CPII 
1989  Neiertz Act (Loi du 31 décembre 1989 relative à la prévention et au règlement des 
difficultés des particuliers et des familles), integrated in the Code de la 
Consommation, Art. L333.4, L333.6  
FICP 
1990  Règlement No. 90-05 du 11 avril 1990 relatif au fichier national des incidents de 
remboursement des crédit aux particuliers  
FICP 
1993  Règlement No. 93-04 du 19 mars 1993 
Modified the No. 90-05 regulation 
FICP 
1995  Règlement No. 95-03 du 21 juillet 1995  
Modified the No. 86-08 regulation  
CPII 
1996  Règlement No. 96-04 du 24 mai 1996 
Amends the No. 90-05 regulation 
FICP 
1998  Loi No. 98-657 du 29 juillet 1998 d’orientation relative à la lutte contre les 
exclusions 
Modified the Code de la Consommation Art. 333.4 (Neiertz Act) 
FICP 
2000  Règlement No. 2000-04 du 6 septembre 2000 modifiant le règlement du 11 avril 
1990 relatif au fichier national des incidents de remboursement des crédit aux 
particuliers  
Modified the No. 90-05 regulation  
FICP 
 
The French system is a centralised public credit registry; therefore, one also has to 
include regulations that belong to the 1989 Neiertz Act and are included in the Consumer 
Protection Code (Code de la Consommation). The regulations published by the CRBF 
have changed so many times in the 1990s that they are presented in Table 2. For further 
                                                 
13 Original title is Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978, relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés.  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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publications on this topic, the reader is referred to the Banque de France (1994, 1995, 
1998, 2000a, 2000b, 2001a, 2001b) and Banisar (2000), Leclercq (2000) and Madsen 
(1992).  
To summarise, all the aforementioned acts and regulations were analysed. The results 
constitute an in-depth analysis of data protection in the field of credit reporting. For the 
sake of brevity, the survey refrains from presenting the evaluation forms with the 
individual acts, their sections and the important sentence that constitutes the right or 
task. In the next section, we explain how data protection regimes might be evaluated.  
2.2 Current Research on Privacy Evaluation  
At the European level, the Commission has to evaluate data protection regimes to find 
out if a third country that is not a member of the European Union exhibits adequate data 
protection. This is a crucial precondition for data exports to the concerned country. 
However, research has not proceeded very far and the tools for evaluation are in their 
infancy and might be only seen as first approaches. Moreover, none of them provides a 
quantitative measure that would make comparisons easier. Without discussing the known 
approaches intensively, we briefly summarise them to contrast our own approach with 
them. Bennett (1992) states that there are five different models of privacy regulation that 
can be applied to data protection regimes: the Voluntary Control Model, the Subject 
Control Model, Licensing Model, Registration Model and the Data Commissioner 
Model. Each of these so-called models differs in the way data protection is regulated, if 
there are any registration or licensing tasks for data controllers or if there exists a data 
protection authority.  
Pincus and Johns (1997) criticise Bennett’s approach in judging data protection regimes: 
Bennett’s Model only shows the privacy choices of a country with respect to who has 
the major responsibility for the protection of data, whereas no mechanism for measuring 
the degree or quality of privacy protections is afforded by the single choices. Therefore, 
the authors propose a technique for measuring the degree of protection afforded by a 
country’s privacy protection scheme. The model consists of two parts, first, the so-called 
Privacy Protection Index; and second, the Privacy Protection Scale. Three fields are 
included by the authors: 1) constructive notice; 2) commission/body/guidelines; and 3) 
remedies, variables in these fields (e.g. data types gathered, storage duration, etc.). Each 
variable receives a score that is then added to the others to obtain a total.  
Reidenberg and Schwartz (1996) conduct a law analysis for comparing the US and 
Europe. This “functional analysis” approach identifies regulations that are functionally 
similar to European regulations. The “multi-layered nature of US data protection” 
(Reidenberg and Schwartz, 1996, p. 19) excludes any approach that is based upon the 
search for a law in the US that is equally comprehensive as the EU laws. Therefore, the 
authors compare the specific context of data use (telecommunications, finance, direct 
marketing and employment) and examine specific treatments of information. The authors 
compare basic elements of European data protection with the combined result of legal 
obligations and established practices in the US. They include not only constitutional, 
statutory and common law, but also corporate practices or internal policies of companies 
(Reidenberg and Schwartz, 1996, p. 25). All in all, the analysis of the authors provides a 
comparative overview of principles that are established on both sides of the Atlantic. In NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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seven cases, the authors find a similar regulations, two are undecided and two are not 
similar.  
As stated, the European Commission has the task to evaluate data protection regimes as 
mandated by Art. 25 of the Data Protection Directive. In the same article, it is 
established that the appraisal of adequate protection in a third country must take into 
account all circumstances that are important for a data transfer. It is a common 
misunderstanding that the directive implies equivalency. Moreover, the imprecision of 
the Directive’s text allows a range of interpretations of what circumstances are meant. 
Several factors are mentioned by the directive itself: the nature of data, objective and 
duration of postings, country of origin and destination as well as general and sector rules 
in effect. The primary evaluation tool of the European Commission is a document from 
1998 (European Commission, 1998b). However, as recognised by a group of researchers 
in a study for the European Commission (1998d, p. 4), the list given in the Directive is 
not exhaustive and no details are given that elaborate on its provisions.  
According to the EU Article 29 Working Party, adequate protection “is typically 
achieved through a combination of rights for the data subject and obligations on those 
who process data (…)” (European Commission, 1998b, p. 5). The Commission finds 
that such rules only protect the individual’s right if they are followed in practice. Against 
this background, the Commission not only evaluates the applicable rules (via legal 
analysis), but also the system to enforce the rules.  
Therefore, one finds a two-sided approach: the rule’s content is taken into account as 
well as the means for their effective implementation. This can be described as a flexible 
discretionary “country-by-country approach” that is more pragmatic than “juristic and 
abstract” (European Commission, 1998d, p. 4).  
The Commission looks at principles of content as well as the enforcement of those 
principles. Such principles address, for example, the processing only for limited 
purposes, the rights of access and correction as well as technical security measures.  
In 2003, there were only three countries that had been judged as providing adequate 
protection: Hungary, Switzerland and Canada. The US, on the other hand, is a special 
case. The establishment of a “safe harbour” agreement is said to create an environment 
of adequate protection, whereas as ad hoc solution contractual agreements between 
companies are also said to provide adequate protection. Since we do not elaborate on 
this, the interested reader is referred to the decision of the European Commission (2000).  
2.3 Evaluation Instrument  
The herewith presented approach is based upon the dissatisfaction with the 
aforementioned works. Although most of them are relatively useful, none of them 
provides a simple comparison that is at the same time quantitative and more transparent. 
The presented approach differs in two important respects: more aspects are evaluated 
(due to the interest in credit reporting only) and federal acts are included, official 
decisions and regulatory rules by the appropriate departments or administration offices as 
well as informal directives (especially in the case of Germany). Professional rules and 
codes of conduct are excluded, since these rules are not established by democratically 
legitimised bodies.  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
 13 
Information flows in consumer credit markets do reveal network character. Networks 
interconnect several players: the right of one player may (at the same time) be the task of 
the other player. This is the case if the data subject exerts the right of access that is the 
task to disclose the information on the side of the credit bureau. Facing these 
interdependencies, we admit that a clear categorisation like “catalogue of data subject 
rights” and “duties of credit bureaus” is not always possible. This problem is reinforced 
by including the information stream from consumer to data-contributing player and to the 
credit bureau. For simplification purposes, we developed four major categories:  
1. Supervisory authority (SA) 
2. Property rights to information (PR) 
3. Obligations by credit bureaus (OC) 
4. Judicial remedies and enforcement (JR) 
Data-contributing players are excluded, since this would include the whole field of 
banking acts or insurance legislation, for example (if they are not regulated by a 
comprehensive data protection law). The evaluation instrument is presented in Table A1 
in the annex.  
The privacy regimes are evaluated for every year within the timeframe 1990-2001. 
Therefore, our analysis constitutes one of the first dynamic ones in the field of data 
protection. Each time new regulations are introduced, the evaluation instrument captures 
their effect and the index changes accordingly. The results of the absolute values gained 
by the individual countries are presented in Table 3. 
Table 3. Absolute numbers of regulations in four selected countries  
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
US  19  19  20  20  20  20  19  23  26  26  28  28 
Europe  17  17  17  17  17  17  17  17  33  33  33  33 
Germany  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  35  35  36  36  38 
Great Britain  26  26  26  26  27  27  27  27  27  35  36  36 
France   40  40  40  40  38  38  38  38  38  39  39  39 
 
2.4 Financial Privacy Index (FPI) 
With an index constructed for the quantitative regulation evaluation it is possible to rate 
countries on a continuum of regulatory regimes. Moreover, an index allows inter-
temporal comparisons and enhances the understanding of regulatory trends. The 
following approach uses a systematic sample (not a random one). It is clear that the 
results only hold for the reviewed countries. Due to our approach, we are able to 
produce a time-series. We briefly explain how the index is constructed and then discuss 
the results.  
2.4.1 Construction of the Financial Privacy Index  
Indices are numbers that summarise economic information and show relative changes. In 
our case, insights derived from index theory are applied to measure regulatory trends (for 
a discussion of methodology see Jentzsch, 2003b and Jentzsch, forthcoming). There are NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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several multiplicative indices available; we chose the Cobb-Douglas index that uses 
weights independently from its values or value shares.  
This index, however, is a “theoretical curiosity” that normally serves the purpose of 
explaining that it is a uniqueness theorem that satisfies all five fundamental axioms.
14 In 
the context of price measurement, the index is of no real value, since it lacks an 
economic interpretation of its weights and the whole index (or the denominator) can 
become zero, i.e. determinateness is not fulfilled (for further discussion, the reader is 
referred to Eichhorn and Voeller, 1983; Selvanathan and Rao, 1994; Jentzsch, 2003b; 
Jentzsch, forthcoming; and von der Lippe, 2002). Especially the latter characteristic does 
not make sense in price measurement. The index is therefore not widely used in 
academia. 
In our context of regulation measurement, however, such peculiar characteristics are 
appreciated. The multiplicative feature accounts for the strong interdependencies we 
observe due to the strong interrelation of the indicators for property rights and judicial 
remedies, for example  
As most indices, the index is constructed through the addition of indicators based upon 
the same range of value (0=non-existent, 1=existent). A simple additive index, however, 
behaves in a way that is not appreciated here, because the score of zero in one 
component (SA, PR, OC or JR) can be balanced by positive values in other components. 
If there is no judicial remedy or punishment for privacy breaches, enforcement is non-
existent. In this theoretical case all other regulations are rendered ad absurdum as they 
cannot be enforced; only the multiplicative construction accounts for this. The whole 
index becomes 0 as soon as the judicial remedies variable becomes 0 or in the theoretical 
case of no regulations (xSA, xPR, xOC = 0). The latter, however, is irrelevant taking the 
empirical reality into consideration. We can therefore conclude that the Cobb-Douglas 
index accounts for total ineffectiveness of data protection, if there are no judicial 
remedies.  
While this characteristic can be appreciated, the Cobb-Douglas index does not meet the 
factor reversal test. However, when fixed weights are assigned, it fulfils the time reversal 
test and the circular test, i.e. transitivity exists (for further discussion, the reader is 
referred to Jentzsch, 2003b). Therefore, the index allows consistent comparisons of 
adjacent periods when weights are held constant (which is the case in our application).  
For constructing the index, a base has to be selected. This, however, influences the 
behaviour of the index and – more important – it may produce biased results. If the 
benchmark in the base period is too high, it artificially depresses the index and vice versa. 
It also has to be avoided to take the number of regulations of one country as a 
benchmark. For instance, if the US (1990) had been chosen, this would have been a 
relatively low level of protection (hence an overstating of the indices for other countries).  
This problem can be avoided by computing an “artificial base” at a hypothetical period t. 
It is the maximum score achievable in the categories SA, PR, OC and JR, divided by 
                                                 
14 Five fundamental axioms are monotonicity, price-dimensionality, linear homogeneity, identity and 
commensurability. Not all of these characteristics are important for our purposes. THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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factor 2. This assures that half of the index (and not the maximum) serves as benchmark. 
Moreover, we include the EU as a “country”, but direct comparisons have to be viewed 
carefully, since the EU is obviously not a country and provides only the frame of 
harmonisation. This explains the low level in the EU until the Data Protection Directive 
remarkably increased the integration depth. 
In the present case, there are “quantities” of regulatory measures that are used as 
weights, the whole index has a “quantity character.”
15 This approach can be justified ex 
ante under the hypothesis that for practical purposes, approximate weights are sufficient 
and in our case they are already implicitly given.  
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Equation (1) presents a general notation of the Cobb-Douglas index (CDI). In equation 
(2) the weights are assigned on a quantity basis. The values as derived are 0.8261 for  1 a  
and 0.1739 for  2 a ; for simplification, we have rounded them to 0.8 and 0.2. The xSA 
denotes values achieved in the category “supervisory authority”, xPR denotes those 
achieved in “property rights to information”, xOC in “obligations of credit bureaus” and 
xJR in “judicial remedies”. Results are given in the Table 4 below. 
Table 4. Cobb-Douglas Financial Privacy Index 
Country  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
US  0.78  0.78  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.84  0.78  0.93  1.12  1.12  1.20  1.20 
Europe  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  0.73  1.42  1.42  1.42  1.42 
Germany  1.47  1.47  1.47  1.47  1.47  1.47  1.47  1.50  1.50  1.56  1.56  1.65 
Britain  1.05  1.05  1.05  1.05  1.09  1.09  1.09  1.09  1.09  1.51  1.55  1.55 
France   1.74  1.74  1.74  1.74  1.64  1.64  1.64  1.64  1.64  1.69  1.69  1.69 
 
2.4.2 Results of the Financial Privacy Index 
In the overall comparison, the FPI1 shows that the US in general remains below EU 
member states’ levels in the direct country comparison. In the inter-temporal comparison 
within the US, the FPIs indicate that laws and federal guidelines became stricter after 
1996 due to reforms under the Clinton administration. However, even after the acts were 
introduced, the US did not converge with the other countries, but remained below their 
levels (see Table 4 above).  
The indices are relatively robust for the results of US-EU comparisons. It is important to 
emphasise that these results are only valid for the very specific field of credit reporting 
                                                 
15 It is possible to empirically estimate the weights, however, data on such variables like times a right is 
exerted by a data subject is not existent.  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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regulation, one of the strictest regulated fields in the US economy. As expected, we also 
observe a convergence among European regimes, the upward trend after 1998 shows 
this. EU member countries are generally above the EU level.  
What drives the indices in the individual countries? The US showed strong gains in the 
category of obligations to credit bureaus (OC) as well as after 1997 in the category that 
counts the rights of data subjects (PR). We also observe that there have been more 
changes in legislation than in any of the other countries. Germany, on the other hand, 
gained in the same categories as the US (OC and PR), and the same was the case for 
Great Britain. France already had a very high level of data protection. France displays 
more tasks for data controllers. The development and behaviour of the indices are 
plotted in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Cobb-Douglas Financial Privacy Indices (1990-2001)  
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In reviewing these functions, it can be observed that some of the indices (France and the 
US) also decrease. This behaviour accounts for the fact that there were rights or tasks 
established that later have been repealed. This is for example the case for the 1992 
decision of the Federal Trade Commission in the US to oblige credit bureaus to disclose 
credit scores, which was revised with the CCRRA of 1996. In France, periods for 
storage of certain data categories have been expanded. One may state that the longer the 
period, the less the data protection (very strict protection in this sense would not allow 
any storage of such data at all). We also observe a major jump in the EU FPI. This is due 
to the increased depth of integration and partially also because of interdependencies in 
the index.  
What are the major qualitative differences between the US and the EU? In the 
supervisory bloc in the EU and unlike the practise in the US, it is the authorities’ 
competence to administer a publicly accessible list of data controllers and the THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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competence of authorities to regulate international data flows.
16 In the bloc of property 
rights to information, we find differences in the opt-out system of the US as compared to 
the opt-in system in the EU. Moreover, there are regulations on automated decisions in 
the EU that do not exist in the US. In the case of the obligations on credit bureaus, we 
find major differences in the absence in the US of any registering or restrictions on 
excessive data collection, which apply in the EU, as well as any explicit security 
measures.  
In summary, there is an international trend showing a weaker regime in the US and a 
more stringent one in Europe. This result holds also for the period after 1995. Viewed 
from a broader perspective, the indices show differences in the regulation of credit 
reporting agencies and gaps in data protection that may eventually divert information 
flows in consumer credit markets, because of the relocation of data controllers.  
However, one has to be careful in interpreting the index results and especially the 
absolute scores of the individual countries. If a country A achieved the number of 30 
regulations and country B of 15, one cannot interpret this result as “A has data 
protection twice as stringent as B,” which would constitute a qualitative interpretation. 
From the approach above one may only derive that “A has twice as much data protection 
regulations as B.” In the absence of other variables, we interpret that as a proxy for the 
quality of the data protection regimes, that is, whether the evaluated regime is a less 
stringent or more stringent one. 
In a further step, we estimate the costs that are connected with the different data 
protection regimes. This however may only be seen as explorative analysis, since the set 
of data collected from a survey of credit bureaus is incomplete. It is very difficult to 
receive replies from some of the credit bureaus, which severely inhibits research in this 
field. We proceed as follows: first we discuss the costs that are associated with some of 
the surveyed regulations. Then we conduct a statistical analysis of the impact of data 
protection on consumer credit markets. 
3. Credit Markets and the Costs of Privacy Regulation  
3.1 Costs of Data Protection 
In all of the reviewed countries it is possible for data subjects to demand to see 
information that is stored by credit reporting agencies. This right to access as well as 
disclosure is a cost factor for the companies. We compiled data from different bureaus in 
the US, Germany and Great Britain. The results are averages weighted by the market 
share of the agencies. The results are not representative and only hold for the companies 
that answered the questionnaire. The figures might nevertheless still be suggestive. 
                                                 
16 This regulation does not necessarily have to be established under a central authority of a data 
protection officer. As far as judicial courts or governmental departments are involved, the author granted 
a positive value in the evaluation.  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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Table 5. Average costs related to access and disclosure* 
Task of data controller  US 
( €) 
Germany 
( €) 
UK 
(€) 
  1995  2001  1995  2001  1995  2001 
ACCESS AND CORRECTION 
Average total cost of a credit 
report directed at the data 
subject  
 
0.45 
 
0.26  
 
9.65 
 
10.77 
 
21.24 
 
15.55 
Average working time (in 
minutes) for preparation of 
report 
 
8.65 min.  
 
 
5.20 min.  
 
11.66 min. 
 
12.39 min. 
 
35 min. 
 
37 min.  
 
Fee charged to subject for 
disclosure of consumer report 
 
7.90  
 
8.61 
 
8.28 
 
7.14 
 
15.67 
 
16.38 
No. of credit reports 
requested by data subjects 
(scaled by population) 
 
n/a 
4,876,270 
(0.01711) 
540,950 
(0.00662) 
715,886 
(0.00897) 
 
n/a 
730,000 
(0.01216) 
Average total costs of 
correction of a credit profile 
 
7.89 
 
 
7.30 
 
21.06 
 
25.87 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
Average working time 
(minutes) spent on correction 
 
7.22 min. 
 
5.66 min. 
 
30.30 min. 
 
32.65 min.  
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY 
Time spent on negotiations 
with data protection 
authorities (hours) 
325 hrs. 
 
500 hrs.  100 hrs.   176 hrs.  n/a  81 hrs. 
Time spent on  
data protection issues by data 
protection appointee 
100,750 
hrs./year 
125,775 
hrs./year 
207,550 
hrs./year 
249,076 
hrs./year 
n/a 
 
n/a 
Opportunity costs produced 
by data protection appointee 
(p.a.)  
n/a  n/a  6,641,511 
 
8,304,720 
 
n/a  n/a 
GER/UK: Cost of seminars 
and training concerning data 
protection (p.a.) 
n/a  n/a  58,141 
 
 
74,992 
 
n/a   1,500 
 
* Numbers represent weighted averages (with weights derived from markets shares of credit bureaus), except for 
the Great Britain (arithmetic averages). Exchange rates are as of 17 January 2003; numbers are rounded. 
 
The direct comparison in Table 5 shows that US bureaus are cost efficient in terms of the 
average costs (including labour costs) of generating a credit report that is directed to the 
data subject. For the reviewed companies in the UK, this seems not to be the case: here 
the costs are relatively high compared to the US and Germany. This picture also holds 
for time efficiency in the case of the preparation of the reports. In Germany and the UK, 
the companies generally estimate that the costs of generating a report for the consumer is 
above the actual fees they charge. With a more comprehensive survey that is 
representative, those results could be verified for the whole population of credit bureaus. 
In general, the information distribution in the consumer credit market of the US exceeds 
that of the European countries. A sign of the confidence in the system might be given by 
the number of consumers that actually demand to see their credit report. When scaled by 
population, the numbers show that in Germany the consumer is least likely to demand the THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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report. This could be due to the fact that the public is less aware of credit reporting or 
that the system functions more smoothly. In UK, on the other hand, consumers seem to 
be more concerned and the number is the highest for the US.  
The average costs of correcting a profile for the reviewed companies also differs at least 
for Germany and the US. Again, we view lower costs in the US and lower working time 
spent on correction of a profile. The differences might be due to scale economies in the 
US, but also due to public pressure and a more efficient use of information technologies.  
The picture reverses itself when one compares the annual hours spent to negotiate with 
data protection authorities on the national as well as state level. It seems that there is 
more time involved in the US than in Germany, which could be due to negotiations but 
also due to the fact that there is more lobbying in general conducted in the US. However, 
when the time is estimated that is attributed to data protection in general, Germany takes 
the lead. The mandatory data protection officer in information-intensive companies in 
Germany is a major cost factor.  
In general it could be assumed that more stringent data protection regimes that pose 
more obligations upon credit reporting agencies help to increase consumer awareness 
and reinforce the incentive of consumers to request, correct and dispute files. From the 
casual evidence above, however, the opposite seems to be the case: the weaker the data 
protection, the more complaints about privacy breaches and the higher the public 
awareness. This translates into pressure on companies to increase their efficiency by 
setting up adequate systems for consumer contact. In the US, this was demonstrated by 
the charges that Experian, TransUnion and Equifax had to pay in 2000 due to violations 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Together, these agencies had to pay $2.5 million for 
failing to maintain a toll-free telephone number at which their personnel are accessible 
for consumers during business hours. According to a Federal Trade Commission press 
release (Federal Trade Commission, 2000c), the agencies, “blocked millions of calls from 
consumers who wanted to discuss the contents and possible errors in their credit reports 
and kept some of those consumers on hold for unreasonably long periods of time.” Such 
charges obviously increase the incentive to provide more efficient access for consumers. 
The disclosure fees also seem to be lower in the United States than in Great Britain and 
Germany. It is difficult to explain such prices (in Germany and Great Britain), since 
advances in computer technology should have contributed to the cost efficiency of such 
activities. However, working time spent on data protection issues, mainly by the 
appointee in a company seems to be higher in Germany (no data are available for the 
UK). As stated, the evidence is only casual and it is more appropriate to conduct a 
statistical analysis of privacy regulations and their effects on consumer credit markets. 
This is also a way to estimate the “economic costs” of data protection.  
3.2 Credit Markets and Information Sharing  
The relationship between credit markets, information sharing and credit reporting has 
been at the centre of several studies in the past (for an overview, see Table 6). We briefly 
summarise the evidence to date and then present our own approach. One of the first 
empirical surveys of information-sharing and credit markets is that of Pagano and 
Jappelli (1993). The authors collected information on 14 OECD countries and divided NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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them into two groups: one with widespread information-sharing and one with data 
exchange on a smaller scale.
17 The authors find that countries with credit bureaus exhibit 
high mobility of consumers and deep consumer credit markets. 
Table 6. Surveys of economic activity of credit bureaus 
Authors  Study design and methodology  Results 
Jappelli 
and  
Pagano 
(2000a) 
 
39-country comparison 
 
Population: Public and private credit bureaus  
Methodology: Regression analysis 
Theoretical predictions are consistent with the 
data: Information sharing (IS) increases bank 
lending, reduces credit risk and is negatively 
correlated with default rates (weak correlation) 
Jappelli 
and  
Pagano 
(2000b) 
 
17-country comparison (EU plus Turkey) 
 
Population: Public and private credit bureaus  
Methodology: Description  
Privacy protection affects the amount of 
information shared;  
CBs originate from local lenders; consolidation 
of the industry 
 
Pagano and  
Jappelli (1993) 
 
14-country survey (OECD)  
 
Population: Public and private credit bureaus  
Methodology: Regression analysis  
IS is positively related to borrower mobility and 
heterogeneity, size of credit market and advances 
in IT; 
IS increases lending volume if adverse selection 
is severe  
 
Moreover, Pagano and Jappelli (1993, p. 1693 and p. 1714) argue that the incentives of 
lenders to share information about borrowers (via a credit bureau) are positively 
correlated to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers and the advances in 
information technologies. The size of the market increases the incentive to share 
information, on the one hand, while the benefit of setting up a credit bureau rises with 
the increase in loan demand, household mobility and the decrease of operational costs of 
the system as well as with the uncertainty about borrower quality. Furthermore, the 
utility of a reporting system increases with the number of participants; therefore, credit 
bureaus are natural monopolies (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993, p. 1699). 
In a follow-up paper, Jappelli and Pagano (2000a) collect information for a sample of 39 
countries (1994-95). Those are divided in three groups: countries without a register, a 
negative one only or a positive register. The authors then experiment with different 
indicators of information-sharing and variables on credit markets.  
In testing for information-sharing and bank lending, the authors rely on quality of 
information shared (exchange of negative information only and exchange of negative and 
positive information). With information-sharing, the ratio of bank lending to GDP is 
higher. Their test on the relationship of information-sharing and credit risk shows that 
countries with data exchange have lower average credit risk (the latter is the 
International Country Risk Guide Financial Indicator, ICRGF). Information-sharing 
reduces the credit risk indicator by 3 points, which may translate into a 1 percentage 
                                                 
17 For the purpose of surveying only the consumer credit markets, the authors exclude mortgage reports 
(Pagano and Jappelli, 1993).  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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point reduction in the fraction of non-performing loans. In general, default rates are 
negatively correlated with information-sharing indicators.  
In summary, information-sharing is associated with larger bank lending to the private 
sector, and mitigates credit risk (as measured by default rates). This is also the case if 
one controls for other economic and institutional variables like growth rate and rule of 
law.  
Like many regression analyses, these results suffer from data problems (noisy indicators) 
and the reverse causality problem. The result that information-sharing leads to greater 
breadth and depth of consumer credit markets might very well be the other way round: 
since credit markets are broader and more transactions take place, information-sharing is 
higher.
18 This problem is acknowledged by the authors.  
Further guidance on the relationship of credit reporting, general information-sharing and 
restrictions posed upon data uses might come from micro-level analysis that experiment 
with prediction precision of scoring models in creditworthiness tests. The latter 
approaches to information-sharing and risk prediction are empirical tests of the 
prediction precision of scorecards (for an overview of scoring development, see Thomas, 
2000). Scoring models are statistical methods to evaluate the credit risk associated with 
the borrower. In general, these models have one assumption in common: data about past 
payment behaviour is useful for predicting future performance. This future performance 
includes voluntary and involuntary default. The first is strategic default, while the latter is 
involuntary, caused by unexpected unemployment or illness (see also Jentzsch and San 
José Riestra, 2003).
19  
In general, the micro-level works analyse the influences that are eroding the prediction 
precision of scoring models. This is mainly tested for the US. One reason for this might 
be the widespread use of scoring as well as the highly advanced development in the US. 
In general, two sources of potential deterioration of a model can be separated: statistical 
insufficiencies (due to population drifts, for instance) and privacy-related restrictions of 
predictor availability. The latter are of special importance for the present study. The 
omitted-variables problem might arise when certain variables are not used due to privacy 
restrictions such as contained in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) in the US 
and in Europe, in the Data Protection Directive and the acts in the individual member 
states. This might lead to an underfitting of scoring models when predictors reveal 
statistically significant correlation, but are not included in a scorecard. Only lately has 
this problem been addressed by different authors (Barron and Staten, 2000; Boyes, 
Hoffman and Low, 1986; and Bostic and Calem, forthcoming).  
These studies show that the prediction precision of a model deteriorates when certain 
variables are forbidden. Bostic and Calem (forthcoming) analyse this effect for the 
gender variable, and Barron and Staten (2000) test these effects for whole information-
                                                 
18 This view may be underpinned by historical evidence. In the US, banks were the first to be founded 
(during colonial times) and credit bureaus followed nearly a century later. One of the first credit bureaus 
was established in 1860 in Brooklyn (Cole, 1992, p. 220).  
19 The latter is especially a cause for over-indebtedness in the US, due to the health system and reduced  
insurance coverage of households. NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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sharing regimes in the US and Australia. The US is a positive-negative regime – the 
distribution of both types of information is allowed, while Australia constitutes a 
negative information regime. Barron and Staten (2000) find that the restriction of 
information sets of market participants increases fuzzy risk predicting and decreases 
allocative efficiency. The authors show how the Australian information set produces 
higher rates of type-I and type-II errors.
20 Accordingly, the more precise discrimination 
of formerly pooled borrowers increases approval rates, whereas an information set with 
only negative predictor variables reduces these rates.  
In summary, the presented studies show that restrictions on predictive scoring variables 
reduce the efficiency of credit scoring models. This also holds if the amount of 
information used is varied, like in the Barron-Staten approach. The potential costs of 
privacy regulations can be quantified economically by the deadweight loss due to 
reduced credit availability, but also by the reduced efficiency if type-I and type-II errors 
lead to a misallocation of credit.  
3.3 Data Protection and Consumer Credit Markets 
The effects of data protection on consumer credit markets are not quite clear. On the one 
hand, there could be positive effects due to increasing transparency of information flows, 
but on the other data protection acts might reduce the information available to market 
participants. The studies reviewed above analyse information-sharing both on the macro-
level by reviewing effects on credit markets and on the micro-level by testing scoring 
models. In the following, we present our set of variables and our approach to the analysis 
of economic costs associated with different data protection regimes.  
3.3.1 Hypotheses 
The major research question is whether a more stringent data protection regime 
(measured by higher FPI) inhibits information allocation in consumer credit markets. This 
could be postulated as the first hypothesis: the higher the FPI, the lower the information 
allocation. A second major interest is to find out if a lower information allocation (as 
approximated by the credit report sales) is associated with a higher credit risk. After 
reviewing the micro- and macro-level literature, it may be stated that more stringent data 
protection regimes are associated with lower information allocation and higher credit 
risk, because financial service providers have less information on consumers to evaluate 
their risk. This may result in misinformed credit decisions that translate into higher credit 
risk on the macroeconomic level. Therefore, our second hypothesis is that lower 
information allocation is associated with higher credit risk.  
A further group of hypotheses refers to credit market characteristics. Lower information 
allocation is thought to result in thinner credit markets (lower percentage of consumer 
credit to GDP) and lower consumer indebtedness. We assume the latter since consumer 
indebtedness is supposed to rise in countries with more credit financing and broader 
credit markets.  
                                                 
20 Type-I errors are omission errors in denying good risks credit, whereas type-II errors are errors of 
commission in granting loans to bad risks (see also Barron and Staten, 2000, p. 21). THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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We proceed as follows. We estimate the relations between the variables by conducting a 
series of tests using Pearson product-moment correlations for the individual countries 
and for cross-country analysis. In a further step, we expand the tests by including a 
cross-country partial correlation analysis.
21  
Studies in the field of credit reporting and consumer credit markets typically suffer from 
problematic data sets (the present study is no exemption). The reason for this is the lack 
of proper official data on important variables such as credit risk and the lack of data from 
private sources such as credit bureaus. The typical methodology employed in this field is 
a large country panel and regression analysis.  
The presented approach differs, however. We reviewed only four industrialised 
countries, but for the period 1990-2001. For the tests, we work with a new data set and 
with data from the European Credit Research Institute. An overview of the variables is 
presented in Box 1 below. Since we also requested information from credit bureaus in 
the US, Great Britain and Germany (there are no credit reporting agencies in France), 
this information was included in our estimates about information allocation and costs of 
data protection. 
Box 1. Overview of variables used in the study 
Financial privacy indices 
(FPI) 
The set of variables is the multiplicative Cobb-Douglas index. The 
index is based upon a set of absolute values of data regulations in each 
country for the years 1990-2001. The index is a proxy for data 
protection regimes in the specific field of consumer credit reporting. 
Information allocation 
(RS) 
Information allocation is the absolute number of credit reports sold in a 
country on a yearly basis. Since this number cannot be observed 
directly, it had to be estimated by using either already published 
estimated or own data. The estimation procedure is not disclosed for 
confidentiality purposes. RS stands for reports scaled (i.e. sold to 
financial service providers). Source: the author. 
Consumer indebtedness 
(CI) 
Consumer indebtedness is a ratio expressing the volume of consumer 
credit outstanding relative to the disposable income of households. This 
ratio rises with the increase of borrowing to finance consumption. 
Source: ECRI. 
Credit-financed 
consumption 
(CCPPC) 
Credit-financed consumption is outstanding consumer credit as 
percentage of private consumption. This measures the weight of credit 
in private consumption transactions. Source: ECRI. 
Consumer credit 
interest rates (INT) 
This data set is constituted of interest rates on consumer loans to 
households. For the European countries these numbers are non-
harmonised. Source: ECB, National Retail Interest Rates Statistics. For 
the US, data are taken from the Federal Reserve’s G.19 consumer credit 
statistics (commercial banks interest rates).  
Real GDP growth 
(GDP) 
Real GDP growth is percentage change from previous period. The US 
uses chain-weighted indices to calculate real GDP and expenditure 
components. Numbers are available for 1990-2001; for 2001 numbers 
                                                 
21 The author repeated the tests below with inflation-corrected terms and by controlling for GDP growth. 
The results, however, did not change significantly and they are not reported.  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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are projections. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, 2001. 
Credit risk 
(RISK) 
Credit risk is household-debt service burden, which is the ratio of debt 
payments, i.e. minimum payments and interest rate payments on 
consumer credit to disposable income. Source for US: Federal Reserve. 
Source for Europe: the authors calculations (based on data from the 
ECB, ECRI, national central banks and estimates of commercial 
financial service providers). 
 
The first set is the FPI. As elaborated above, the index is a very specific measure that 
was only applied to credit reporting regulation. Therefore, the index is precise enough to 
capture the most important regulations.  
The variable for information allocation (RS stands for reports scaled), on the other hand, 
is more problematic. The credit bureaus were asked to disclose their sales for the years 
1995 and 2001, associated growth rates in the 1990s and the percentage of credit reports 
sold to financial service providers. From the data, the percentage of reports sold for 
consumer credit purposes could be estimated. These numbers, together with estimates 
from other sources (like industry publications) were compiled to serve as a rough proxy 
for information allocation. The number was then scaled by the population in the country. 
The results are plotted in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Information allocation in four selected countries (1990-2001)  
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The credit market indicators are less problematic. Consumer indebtedness (CI) is the 
ratio of consumer credit outstanding to disposable income of households. Credit-
financed consumption is the outstanding consumer credit as a percentage of private 
consumption (CCPPC) and as credit market breadth or availability, we included 
consumer credit (excluding mortgages) as a percentage of GDP (CCGDP). On consumer 
credit interest rates (INT), moreover, data from the European Central Bank and the 
Federal Reserve Board is used. These data are available for all countries, except for the 
Great Britain (1990-95).  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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Real GDP growth rates (GDP) as proxy for business cycle fluctuations were collected 
from the OECD Economic Outlook (with estimates for 2001). Another somewhat 
problematic variable is the credit risk estimate (RISK). For the US, there are official 
numbers on debt-service burden of households: the service on consumer debt in relation 
to disposable income.
22 This service includes average monthly minimum payments as 
well as interest rate payments. European numbers are calculated by using consumer 
credit interest rates and disposable income. However, data on minimum payments are 
neither collected by the European Central Bank nor by the individual central banks. 
Therefore, estimates from governmental departments as well as financial service 
providers were used. With these estimates it was possible to construct a time-series of 
credit risk in the individual countries, however, some of the information is missing in the 
case of Great Britain.
23 The results are plotted in Figure 3.  
Figure 3. Estimated credit risk in four selected countries (1990-2001)  
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We also discussed the inclusion of other possible intervening variables such as creditor 
rights as presented by La Porta et al. (1997). This is problematic, however, since the 
indicator is estimated only for one year. There is not really an statistical explanation for 
including it as constant quantity.  
 
 
                                                 
22 This is regarded to be “credit risk”, because it tends to lead delinquencies and predict bankruptcies 
(Maki, 2000, p. 5)   
23 This is a better approximation of (consumer) credit risk than other indicators such as the ICRGF 
which includes risks unrelated to consumer credit (such as losses from exchange controls).  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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3.3.2 Pearson’s Correlations for Individual Countries 
Results for the test of interdependency of FPI and information allocation for the 
individual countries are given in Tables A2-A5 in the Annex. For the US, we have a 
strong positive correlation (.873) that is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The 
same holds for Germany (.919) and Great Britain (.843), both statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. Note that the signs are positive. The implication of this is contrary to our 
hypothesis that higher FPIs are associated with lower information allocation. It seems 
that for those countries the reverse is true: the higher the distribution of credit reports, 
the higher is also the FPI (that is, more data protection regulations exist). We will 
explain this counterintuitive result further below. France, however, displays a correlation 
that is statistically not significant. Growth rates of disclosures in France could be severely 
underestimated, producing a misleading result in this case. 
The observation that in other countries sales of credit reports increase with increasing 
data protection regulations crucially depends on assumptions about credit report sales. 
As stated, we had to estimate the numbers, but from the questionnaires of our survey we 
got strong evidence that suggests that credit report sales increased remarkably in the 
1990s, which is certainly due to increasing information technology adoption and the 
reduced costs of administration of such files. The results cannot, of course, be 
interpreted as causality. However, the strength of the relationship proposes an alternative 
explanation that can be further augmented by historical evidence.  
It seems that increasing information allocation leads to increasing public awareness about 
privacy problems in general. In the 1990s, this was accompanied by the large-scale 
adoption of the internet that further raised such concerns. In a political economy 
approach, one might state that this awareness translated into increasing pressure from 
constituents to alter legislation and increase the rights of data subjects and the tasks for 
data controllers. That is something we could demonstrate by the evaluation of individual 
countries and the upward trend in the FPIs. Increasing data protection awareness has 
obviously not been on the agenda of the French data subjects – they already enjoy very 
high protection. Of course, it would be necessary to wait another ten years to measure 
how the legislative changes in the latter half of the 1990s affected the relationship of the 
FPI and information distribution in the long-run.  
The second hypothesis stated that increasing credit report sales increase risk prediction 
capabilities of financial service providers and therefore should be negatively correlated 
with credit risk on the aggregate level. As we review the individual countries, we get 
mixed evidence for such a relationship (Tables A2-A5 in the Annex).  
Again, we take the scaled credit report distribution, but this time, we relate it to credit 
risk. For the US and France, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Germany, on 
the other hand, displays a negative correlation (-.780) and Great Britain a positive one 
(.918), both statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, the tests on the level of 
individual countries do not show any clear relation between information distribution and 
credit risk.  
Another interesting question is whether reduced sales of credit reports result in less 
access to consumer credit (as a percentage of GDP) and lower levels of consumer 
indebtedness. The connection between sales of credit reports and consumer credit as a THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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percentage of GDP is the following. In the US (.777), the Great Britain (.899) and 
France (.939), the relationship is positive and significant. That means that higher sales of 
reports are associated with a higher ratio of consumer credit and GDP. Access, if we 
interpret the variable in this way, is then increased by higher information allocation. 
Germany, however, does not fit this picture, for here we discern no statistically 
significant relationship. The same kind of association also holds for consumer 
indebtedness in the US (.790), the Great Britain (.890) and France (.925). Here too, 
Germany displays no relationship. Along with the broadened access to consumer credit 
(facilitated by the increasing distribution of information about potential borrowers) 
comes the increase of consumer indebtedness. The latter is highly associated with this 
expanded access.  
We originally assumed that stringent data protection rules reduce information allocation. 
This relationship cannot be observed in the individual countries, instead the contrary 
holds. If we directly test for the association of the FPI with credit access and consumer 
indebtedness, the following picture emerges: in the first case a positive correlation exists 
only for the US and Great Britain as English common law countries. The correlations for 
Germany and France are again not significant in both tests. Therefore, we find no general 
relationship that would hold for all of our countries. In a next step, we turn to cross-
country evidence.  
3.3.3 Pearson’s Correlations and Cross-Country Evidence 
Due to the very little numbers of observations in each country, we expand the tests by 
conducting a cross-country analysis. On the background of the initial tests, we now 
modify the first hypothesis by stating that a higher FPI is correlated with higher 
information allocation. The results of the analysis are presented in Table A6 in the annex. 
This time, however, the association of both indicators is statistically significant correlated 
with a negative sign (-.622) – the one we would have expected in the analysis above. In 
cross-country comparisons, a higher FPI is obviously associated with lower credit report 
sales. This reinforces our initial assumption that the US, for example, has lower data 
protection and more credit report sales, whereas the opposite holds for more stringent 
data protection regimes like France.  
Within the individual countries, however, the relation seems to be positive due to the 
reasons explained above. The political economy approach, however, does not work on 
the international level, since there is no international data protection authority to which 
complaints could be directed (note that we have not included an EU aggregate). Note 
also that we did not rely upon absolute indicators of consumer credit markets, but on 
percentages of GDP.  
Concerning information allocation and credit risk, we did not receive a strong result that 
credit report sales decrease credit risk. Therefore, we reiterate our assumption that the 
variables must be intuitively correlated in a negative way, i.e. higher information 
allocation is associated with lower credit risk.  
This time, we find a positive relation (.592). This is as counterintuitive as the weak 
results in the individual countries. It was stated that risk prediction capabilities should 
increase and as a consequence, credit risk should be lowered. If a household already has NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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a relatively high debt-service burden as a consequence of indebtedness, the marginal 
propensity to grant credit should decrease. 
We initially assumed that this translates into lower credit risk on the aggregate level. The 
result is statistically significant on the 0.01 level, as well as the positive relations of credit 
report sales with the variables for consumer indebtedness (.585) and consumer credit as a 
percentage of GDP (.724). On the international level, a higher distribution of credit 
reports is obviously associated with increased consumer indebtedness and broader credit 
markets. Such a positive relationship also holds for credit risk.  
One explanation for this is that with increasing consumer indebtedness, a higher part of 
consumption will be financed by credit and more credit reports are sold as a 
consequence. Less surprising is that credit risk is highly associated with consumer 
indebtedness (.762) and consumer credit as percentage of GDP (.778). When we repeat 
the tests directly with the FPI, we find that it is significantly negatively correlated with 
consumer indebtedness (-.477), consumer credit as percentage of GDP (-.632) as well as 
consumption financed by credit (-.318). 
The following relationships can now be established: the more stringent are data 
protection regimes in cross-country comparisons, the lower are credit report sales. With 
increasing information allocation, both consumer indebtedness as well as consumer credit 
as a percentage of GDP rise. Both go hand in hand it was stated. The more credit reports 
are sold, the more credit risk will increase, since both variables are positively correlated. 
If we exclude the reports and conduct the tests directly with the FPI, we find that 
countries with higher FPIs have lower credit access, credit risk and consumer 
indebtedness. 
How can these results be explained? First, we have to state that the analysis above 
involves only simple Pearson correlations for a few countries, but they might provide 
some first indications. Such an analysis always suffers from problems of omitted 
variables and we are not able to draw any conclusions about causal relations. Moreover, 
rising credit risk as well as consumer indebtedness are certainly a function of economic 
conditions. Households will borrow more if wages rise or job prospects look good. 
Wage income is still the major income source of the average US household, so the job 
market and the stability of the income stream – both of which are related to the business 
cycle – will be of the utmost importance. We now turn to partial correlation coefficients.  
3.3.4 Partial Correlation Coefficients: Cross-Country Evidence  
We start to control for variables in the following way: first, the interdependency of the 
FPI and information allocation will be checked by controlling for economic growth. 
Table 7 presents the results. The negative relationship as we observed in cross-country 
comparisons remains statistically significant, but to a somewhat weaker extent. However, 
the statistical significance vanishes when we control for consumer market breadth or for 
the latter and consumer indebtedness in a second-order partial correlation.  
The interdependency of information allocation and credit risk, on the other hand, remains 
statistically significant in first-order test with controlling for GDP. In the other cases, the 
relationship vanishes. In the relation of the FPI with the risk proxy, we also get statistical 
significance, the sign remains the same: negative, and this is the case in first-order partial THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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analysis (controlling for GDP growth) and in the second-order analysis controlling for 
consumer indebtedness and consumer credit.  
Table 7. Cross-country partial correlation coefficients 
Control variables 
(2-tailed significance) 
FPI – RS  RS – RISK  FPI – RISK 
First-order partial correlations 
GDP growth 
 
-.6156**  .5480**  -.6514** 
 
Consumer credit % GDP 
 
-.3069  .0747  -.2924 
 
Second-order partial correlations 
Consumer indebtedness, 
consumer credit % GDP 
-.2048  .1509  -.5140** 
 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Especially GDP growth appeared to be a candidate for intervening influence, but the 
interdependencies of the FPI with information allocation or credit risk or information 
allocation and risk remain statistically significant on the 0.01 level. Due to the small data 
set, the model should not be over-fitting. Therefore, we refrain from including further 
variables (household saving or consumer expenditure, for example) and we refrain from 
conducting a regression analysis.  
In sum, we observe that across countries, a rising number of data protection regulations 
is associated with lower information allocation, lower credit risk and decreased 
consumer indebtedness. However, with decreasing FPIs (and hence increasing 
information allocation), consumer indebtedness increases as well as the other variables 
that served as indicators for the consumer credit market. In addition, credit risk will rise.  
In the following, another explanation of the observations is proposed. As stated, in the 
individual countries, higher information allocation is associated with higher FPIs, 
whereas countries with high FPIs in comparison to those with lower ones do exhibit 
lower information allocation. However, if credit markets are broader, more transactions 
take place and more credit reports will be sold. The expansion of the consumer credit 
market increases marginal risk associated with less creditworthy households – this is the 
reason why credit risk increases on the aggregate level.
24  
Current statements from the credit reporting business (see e.g. Experian, 1996, p. 12) 
might help to further reinforce these assumptions: “In general, the usage of credit 
profiles (and related services) is driven by consumer demand for credit (via new credit 
cards, automobile loans, home mortgages and refinancing and other consumer loans) and 
lenders’ efforts to develop new, and monitor existing, credit relationships.” Hence, the 
broader the credit market, the higher the information allocation and the higher the credit 
risk.  
                                                 
24 Note that this aggregate level is not the overall credit market in the economy, but the consumer credit 
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4. Competition and Market Structure in Credit Reporting Industries 
4.1 Competition in Information Markets  
One of the major questions that arises in the context of efficiently working consumer 
credit markets is what kind of industrial organisation exists in the credit reporting 
industry. It could be very well the case that competition in such markets increases 
information allocation and leads to a more efficient distribution of consumer credit. 
However, information markets differ in certain important respects from traditional 
markets, and the credit reporting industry in Europe in particular underwent major 
changes in the 1990s.  
The competition in the credit reporting industry constitutes an example of competition in 
information markets par excellence. Such markets differ from traditional markets in 
several specific characteristics, because they are dependent on network structures within 
which information goods are traded. We will first elaborate on the general characteristics 
of information markets and then describe the trends in credit reporting.  
Networks are a form of industrial organisation and market governance. As coordination 
mechanism, networks influence market structures as well as aggregate economic results. 
Different authors have modelled networks among economic agents employing influence 
matrices (Steyer and Zimmermann, 1998), cascade models or polya urn schemes 
(Willinger and Ziegelmeyer, 1998). Others have employed spatial models that locate 
agents on lattices (Jonard and Yildizoglu, 1998, and Nelson and Winter, 1982). These 
models are mainly concerned with technology adoption, localised learning and network 
externalities; few of them explicitly focus on information networks.  
Network structures, however, reveal some economically significant characteristics that 
cannot be neglected. With the aforementioned approaches, it is possible to explore 
economically relevant problems such as dependence on initial conditions (Arthur, 1990 
and 1994), path-dependence (David, 1985), critical mass, bandwagon effects, positive 
feedback (Economides, 1993 and 1996), as well as standardisation problems (Besen and 
Farrell, 1994). These features generate concentration processes that transform a polypoly 
to an oligopoly or even a monopoly (so-called winner-takes-most markets; see 
Economides, 2001).  
The technological complementarities of network components generate network 
externalities and positive feedback (in some cases also negative feedback) on the demand 
or supply side. While these characteristics are normally observed in telecommunications 
infrastructures, some of them can also be applied to information networks. These kinds 
of networks abstract from technological infrastructures, since participants that share the 
same information constitute such a network. These agents can be described as nodes in 
the network, whereas the links between them depend on a probability that varies inter-
temporally (for a broader example, see Kirman, 1997).  
The architecture of the network is constituted of the number of participants as well as 
the symmetry (or asymmetry) of data flows between them and the system of information 
flows. This is the problem of star networks with a monopolist information producer vs. 
multiple point networks with several information producers constituting an information 
oligopoly, for instance. Information diffusion and its efficiency are influenced by the THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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network architecture and the channels; hence architecture influences economic 
outcomes. In this context, information is at the same time integrated in vertical networks 
(as part of the value chain) as well as in horizontal networks (exchanges among different 
firms of the same industry). Despite the fact that there is little economic literature on the 
specific efficiency problems, one can apply certain network characteristics to credit 
reporting as discussed below. 
In credit reporting markets, the information flows among agencies, information suppliers 
and consumers constitute such a network of information which reveals strong feedback 
effects: its value increases as more creditors are connected to it. An increasing number of 
data sources produces a more detailed profile of the data subject and in turn enhances the 
risk prediction capabilities of the interconnected participants. The contributions of an 
increasing number of data sources will almost inevitably (regulatory architecture ceteris 
paribus) increase the flow of information among the agents.  
Information exchange, however, has to be standardised (as well as the meaning of terms 
such as bankruptcy) to ensure an effective flow among network participants. Moreover, 
the more a network of one agency increases, the more attractive it will be for potential 
participants leading to considerable bandwagon effects and network externalities. As far 
as financial service providers deliver information to one of the agencies, excess inertia 
may be generated from the costs that arise from switching to another network. This has 
not been discussed in the literature so far. Instead, there is only anecdotal evidence. 
Experian, for example, claims that it has long-standing customer relationships with the 
top 25 customers for over a decade (Experian, 1996, p. 44).  
Credit reporting competition reveals specific demand- and supply-side characteristics. 
The information furnisher is the bank, insurance or any other credit-granting company. 
However, this party is also the demander of the information as codified in reciprocity 
contracts in credit reporting arrangements. These contracts have to establish incentive 
alignments (the disclosure of truthful information) to ensure the efficiency of the 
reputation system. All information suppliers are granted access to the data base, while 
non-disclosure is sanctioned. This has not always been without problems, since it 
produces significant effects on competition. 
Market dynamics are to a crucial extent dependent on the consumer demand for credit. 
This demand for credit cards, mortgages, automobile loans or other consumer loans 
expands the demand for consumer profiles and related services:  
Consumer demand for credit tends to increase during periods of economic 
expansion, and lenders’ efforts to monitor credit relationships tend to increase during 
periods of economic contraction. Consequently, revenue from consumer credit 
information products is influenced by cyclical economic trends related to consumer 
debt (Experian, 1996, p. 12).
25 
Market barriers in this competitive surrounding are created by the already existent 
network of the triopoly as found in the US, for example, and the high costs establishing 
                                                 
25 Note that this is turning the logic around, as discussed in the section on empirical surveys. 
Information-sharing is higher, because consumer credit markets are broader and deeper in times of 
economic expansion.  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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such a network. Companies will only enter the market if benefits are greater than the 
costs of market entry and if it is expected that the market will further expand in the 
future. As long as profit margins are high enough, other players will be attracted. In the 
US as well as Great Britain, a triopoly developed. The intense pricing competition as 
well as the established networks in the US may operate like private barriers to market 
entry. 
Credit reports as information goods exhibit problems that may deteriorate the allocative 
efficiency of competitive market mechanisms. These characteristics are: non-excludability 
as in the case of public goods, non-rivalry, indivisibility, immateriality and experience 
character (Allen, 1990, and Romer, 1990). In the commodification process some of the 
natural characteristics of information have to be transformed to achieve tradability. This 
is for example done via the definition of a property rights structure. The thinner property 
rights are, the more likely are externalities that may eventually produce market failure 
(Coase, 1960). Specifically relating to privacy, problems of externalities and the 
definition of property rights have been discussed by Varian (1996) and Laudon (1996).  
One has to distinguish three kinds of transactions: (1) the primary transaction between 
the consumer and the bank with aligned incentives; (2) the secondary transaction 
between the bank and the credit reporting agency; and (3) tertiary transaction between 
the credit reporting agency and third parties. In the secondary and tertiary transactions, 
externalities can arise, since incentives of consumers and credit reporting agencies are no 
longer aligned; moreover, if information transactions are not transparent, consumers 
cannot exert their rights of blocking access which may result in information 
misallocation. The general characteristics of information goods, as well as their 
associated scale and scope economies lead to product diversification through 
differentiation strategies, something that is observable in the credit reporting market. 
Property rights for information are split among furnisher and information intermediary 
(the credit bureau). The value added by the information intermediary is the accumulation 
of the information from different sources that are depersonalised and the analysis of the 
data.  
In summary, one can observe network structures, while on the other hand there are 
certain characteristics of information goods (similar to those of public goods) and 
externalities that are typical of information markets. Another problem arises from the 
strong concentration processes. However, they do not naturally result in weak 
competition (depending on the strength of competition supervision). Upstream market 
inefficiencies, it has to be noted, may reveal effects on downstream industries that 
depend on such information goods (for example, the banking or insurance industry). 
Upstream inefficient information allocation, may inhibit the competition in downstream 
industries. 
Apart from the aforementioned general economic insights, there are certain trends that 
can be observed especially in the 1990s. First, the traditional core business of credit 
reporting has changed enormously in the 1990s due to the progress in information 
technologies and the increasing competition pressure in the mature information market of 
the US. Today’s credit reporting bureaus – information service providers – not only 
provide profiles, but all kinds of risk management products (e.g. scoring or screening 
services) and increasingly also products and services for consumers such as score THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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simulators and advice on consumer credit habits. TransUnion and Experian only lately 
started to expand their business into the consulting field, advising their clients on data 
assessment and modelling as well as on fraud reduction (Lee, 2002a, p. 8). The reason 
for this is the high pressure on consumer reporting agencies in pricing as well in 
servicing. While one observes an expansion into new areas on the one hand, there is the 
reduction of some traditional activities like the collection business on the other.  
Second, there are convergence processes in respect to segments of the information 
market (for example, marketing information and creditworthiness information). This 
seems to be especially the case in e-commerce with the emergence of vast collections of 
personal data that are intended for marketing purposes (Groupement Français de 
l’Industrie de l’Information, 2000). The reporting agencies also hold vast direct 
marketing data bases that contain lifestyle and demographic information (Lee, 2002a, p. 
8); moreover, in the US, the major credit bureaus have cooperation arrangements with 
the information services and data mining company Acxiom to provide packages that 
combine demographic and credit information (Fickenscher 1999).  
Third, there are signs that new competitors are also entering the market from the side of 
scoring services or business reporting services. For example, Fair, Isaac, the major US 
provider of scoring products, intends to establish a service for consumers to notify them 
if their scores have changed and to provide consolidated consumer reports (that is, 
reports merged from all three credit bureaus). This would actually put the company in 
more direct competition with the credit bureaus (Lee, 2002b). In Germany and the UK, 
we have found examples of business reporting companies (Creditreform as well as D&B) 
expanding their operations into the field of consumer reporting.  
And fourth, there is the trend of integration of certain parts of the value chain, e.g. the 
convergence of information and software applications (Groupement Français de 
l’Industrie de l’Information, 2001).  
We briefly review in the next section the competition trends in the relevant countries. 
Due to severe problems with limited data availability on this issue, it is not possible to 
construct a concentration index like CR4, CR8 or the Herfindahl-Hirschman index for 
the European countries. There are, however, official indices for the US. It is only 
possible to roughly describe the competition in the individual EU countries and to add 
anecdotal evidence on important merger and acquisition activities. This is sufficient, 
however, to gain an overview of the latest developments. 
4.2 Competition in the US Credit Reporting Industry 
Credit bureaus developed in the United States with the increased household mobility and 
mass urbanisation in the second half of the 19
th century, as Pagano and Jappelli  (1993, p. 
1711) note. Due to these socio-economic developments, informational asymmetries 
between creditors and borrowers worsened – a problem that could be ameliorated by the 
information collection of credit bureaus. In the US, banking regulation contributed to the 
establishment of information-sharing arrangements, because it created barriers of entry 
by establishing the dual banking system (National Bank Acts of 1863 and 1864) and 
restrictions on branching (McFadden Act of 1927). The latter resulted in state-wide and NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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limited area branching as well as unit banking.
26 This segmented market structure 
allowed potential competitors to share valuable information via credit bureaus.  
In fact, business reporting developed earlier than consumer credit reporting. Early credit 
reports date back to 1841, an historical hand-written collection of them from the period 
1841-1891 is owned by Harvard University.
27 Over time, companies also started to 
collect information on consumers. Cole (1992, p. 220) reports that one of the first credit 
bureaus was established in Brooklyn in 1860. In the 1890s, J.E.R. Chilton, which later 
became one of the leading companies, started to collect information on customers in 
Dallas, Texas.  
In 1906, the first national organisation of credit bureaus was founded – the National 
Association of Retail Credit Agencies (later Associated Credit Bureaus, ACB, and now 
the Consumer Data Industry Association, CDIA). This organisation was set up as a 
network of six small credit reporting agencies. The founding of credit bureaus increased 
remarkably in the 1920s as well as the 1950s with the introduction of credit instruments 
such as instalment credit and credit cards. During that period, the credit reporting market 
was local: information was collected from local lenders and distributed locally.  
In the 1970s, however, the industry started to employ IT on a larger scale. Such 
investments and the following database concentration precipitated consolidation and 
concentration processes in the industry. The larger market-players began to bring smaller 
bureaus into their computer systems to benefit from their information collection. And the 
smaller agencies, on the other hand, used the computer processing power and network of 
the larger companies. Local credit bureaus either became affiliates of one of the 
computer systems that profited from cheaper inter-bureau pricing schemes or remained 
independent as resellers of credit reports (explained further below). Both the repositories 
and their local affiliates that delivered information co-owned the information.  
The profits attracted several companies; for instance the ACB founded ACB Services by 
1970.
28 In the 1980s, there were five credit reporting systems in the market: TransUnion, 
TRW (that became Experian), Equifax, Chilton Corporation and Pinger Systems. The 
Chilton Corporation eventually merged with TRW, whereas Pinger was sold to the 
Computer Science Corporation. To complete national coverage, the companies 
established a network of affiliates.  
The concentration tendency was reinforced by the tendency towards natural monopoly, 
which in turn had resulted from credit bureaus achieving economies of scale and scope, 
allowing them to capture an ever-larger market share.
29 Moreover, since industries like 
retailers or financial services also consolidated, they demanded national service. In the 
                                                 
26 These acts as well as the Bank Holding Act of 1956 and the Bank Merger Act of 1966 have been 
revised in the major reform of the financial services industry: the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999.  
27 It was donated to the university by R.G. Dun & Company (which later became D&B). 
28 In 1989, this company was bought by Consumer Credit Associates, and a few years later bought and 
sold again by the First Data Corporation, which renamed the division Innovis Data Solutions.  
29 In addition, credit bureaus try to receive information from as many sources as possible (Cole, 1992, p. 
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1970s, there were 2,250 credit bureaus in the market. This number has been reduced to 
1,833 bureaus in 1997 (US Census Bureau, 2000). Due to network externalities and the 
special competition surrounding information industries, an oligopolistic market structure 
emerged.  
This structure is three-tiered. At the very top is the triopoly Experian, Equifax and 
TransUnion (Top-3). These three companies are called repositories, since they provided 
the computer systems that small credit bureaus could not afford. Industry officials 
estimate that those companies serve 95% of the consumer credit reporting market. 
Officially it is claimed that all three of them have approximately the same market share 
and together maintain files on about 190 million Americans (Consumer Data Industry 
Association, 2002). In 1996, however, Experian (1996, p. 3) claimed: “The Company 
believes that it is one of the two largest providers of consumer credit information and the 
second largest provider of business credit information in the United States.” 
In the lower medium range, we find some larger affiliates like CBC Companies. And at 
the end of the spectrum, there are about 1,800 small credit bureaus. The latter are either 
affiliates of one of the Top-3 or independent, as noted. As an affiliate, information is 
delivered reciprocally. The small credit bureaus are mainly concentrated on their local 
markets and supply enhanced reports, whether they merge reports from the three big 
companies or enhance reports by adding own information collected from local 
information sources such as courthouse records or local lenders. This extra information 
provided the incentive for the big agencies to sign contracts with the small bureaus, but 
this is changing as more and more nationally active retailers deal directly with one of the 
Top-3.  
Independent resellers, on the other hand, do not carry out information collection on their 
own (the term “independent” is misleading). Instead, they also buy credit reports from 
the repositories and merge them. The smaller bureaus are mainly occupying niche 
markets, e.g. tenant screening, employment or mortgage reporting. This is mainly due to 
the competitive advantage enjoyed by the Top-3 in national credit reporting for financial 
services.  
In the 1990s, the repositories followed an active acquisition strategy in buying their 
affiliates. In 2002, Experian announced that it bought three affiliate credit bureaus (the 
company has 38 affiliates in the US) and that it intended to buy additional affiliated 
bureaus. The series of acquisitions is supposed to be completed in the next three years 
(Experian, 2002c). TransUnion only has one affiliate left, and Equifax has an estimated 
15 affiliates. Industry officials estimate that there will be no affiliates left in the next five 
years.  
The information pooled by a credit reporting agency is provided by various sources, for 
example, banks, credit card companies, retailers, insurance companies, leasing 
companies, employers or various public sources.
30 The disclosure incentive of creditors is 
ensured by the reciprocity principle, as noted. In general, the credit bureau serves as a 
                                                 
30 Public records reviewed for data collection purposes are criminal records, property lien records and 
bankruptcy filings (Schwartz and Reidenberg, 1996, p. 288). NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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conduit that secures precipitated information accumulation and channelling. In addition 
to credit reports, it also provides scoring and other services. 
As Cole (1992, p. 231) states, credit bureaus usually charge a base fee for their services 
and an additional amount that depends on the volume of transmitted reports. Through 
the aforementioned inter-bureau reporting schemes, the movements of individuals can be 
traced throughout the US while at the same time creditors in various locations have 
access to the databases of the major bureaus.  
The Top-3 agencies individually negotiate contracts with large customers. They pay an 
estimated $0.40 per credit report; small users that only demand several hundred reports 
per month are charged an estimated $1.50-$2.00 (2002).  
Scale and scope effects also affect coverage, which has the propensity to universality. 
The more sources are connected to the network, the more detailed becomes the credit 
report and the more precise may become the risk prediction.  
Credit bureaus compete in several dimensions: price, coverage rates, data quality, 
scoring services and coverage of information segments. The latter includes demographic 
and marketing information on behaviour and lifestyles or business information. The 
industrial organisation differs from segment to segment. For instance, Experian competes 
with D&B in business reporting, but with Equifax and TransUnion in consumer credit 
reporting and a range of other companies in marketing (Abacus Direct, Acxiom 
Corporation, etc.).  
In the US, coverage of the consumer credit market approached universality in the 1960s 
(Pagano and Jappelli, 1993, p. 1712). Nowadays, approximately 1 billion credit profiles 
are sold per year (Masons, 2002, p. 3).  
The US market is a mature business that has developed over decades. Credit bureaus are 
facing high pressure in the pricing as well as in the servicing dimension. Financial 
institutions now seek to shop for reports from only one bureau instead of all three (Lee, 
2002a). All three are supposed to provide credit reports based upon differing data on the 
same individual (Lee, 2002a), but in fact it is not quite clear if the credit reports are 
substitutes in their information content or concerning their score.
31 They also differ in the 
methods of data and risk analysis. The five leading online credit information providers 
(according to their aggregated sales) are presented in Table 8. 
The above-mentioned network of big and small credit bureaus is not shown by the 
statistical numbers quoted from the US Census Bureau (2000). It appears that the credit 
reporting industry is largely an industry of rather small, regional players with less then 
100 employees and no or only one other establishment.
32 The majority of consumer 
reporting agencies in the US are single-unit firms compared to only six agencies with ten 
or more establishments. Table 9 presents the official concentration ratios for 1992 and 
1997.  
                                                 
31 This is certainly an area of future research.  
32 Before 1987, consumer reporting agencies were published as part of a broader category (SIC 7321) in 
the official US statistics; therefore, one cannot really compare the cited numbers with the earlier 
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Table 8. US market leaders in credit information provision 
Year  Position  Company  Revenues  
1998  1.  Equifax  $1.1 billion  
  2.  D&B  $985 million  
  3.  Experian  $576 million (for 1999) 
  4.  TransUnion  $536 million  
  5.  CSC Credit Services  $257 million  
2001  1.  Experian  $1.5 billion  
  2.   D&B  $1.4 billion  
  3.   Equifax  $1.1 billion  
  4.  TransUnion  $1 billion  
  n/a  CSC Credit Services  n/a 
Sources: Numbers for 1998 are taken from the Electronic Information Report (1999). The sales of these 
five companies represent 92% of the market. Estimate for TransUnion (2001) is based on 
CoolSavings, Inc. (2001). The other numbers are compiled from press and industry 
publications.  
 
 
Table 9. Concentration by the largest credit reporting agencies (receipts) 
Year   Concentration ratio  Receipts (percent) 
1992   CR4  21.5 
  CR8  28.2 
  CR20  36.5 
1997  CR4  53.2 
  CR8  68.0 
  CR20  75.9 
Source: US Census Bureau (1995, 2000). 
 
4.3 Competition in the European Credit Reporting Industry 
The markets for credit reporting are not only differently structured in the US compared 
to Europe, but also within European member states. We briefly review the history of 
credit bureaus in Europe and then survey the market structure and competition as it 
evolved in the 1990s. In contrast to their US counterparts, European credit bureaus have 
so far mainly focused on national markets. However, due to the deepening economic 
integration and technological advances, Europeans witnessed an intensification of 
competition in the second half of the 1990s, as well as an increasing merger and 
acquisition activity accompanying the market entry of the major US companies.  
The earliest private credit bureaus were established in Europe at about the same time as 
in the US. In Austria, a bureau was founded in the 1860s, followed by Sweden in the 
1890s (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000b). However, where banks competed in a national 
market, credit reporting agencies developed later and on a smaller scale. In Europe, most 
private credit bureaus were founded in the 1960s and 1980s. The European system of 
credit information-sharing is also characterised by public credit registers that are mainly 
operated by national central banks. These registers are mandatory reporting systems that 
operate like credit bureaus, but all financial institutions under the supervision of the NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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central bank have to report to it. Most of the public credit bureaus have been set up in 
the second half of the 20
th century. These systems set a reporting threshold on loans that 
varies from country to country and from a several hundred dollars to over one million 
dollars (for a more detailed survey, see Estrella et al., 2000, pp. 77-86). Especially the 
high thresholds cut off data on household loans. The registers will also be reviewed 
briefly due to their importance. 
The operations of private credit bureaus in Europe range from an exchange of great 
amounts of positive and negative data (Great Britain, Germany and Sweden) to exchange 
on a medium scale (Finland and the Netherlands), and finally to only rudimentary 
exchange in its infancy (Portugal and Greece). In France, however, there exists only a 
negative information exchange. 
As acknowledged, it is important to notice that the European credit reporting business 
has primarily focused on national markets until the mid-1990s. This, however, is 
changing rapidly. The industry now experiences the intensification of competition related 
to the market entries of the Top-3: Experian has bought or cooperates with a number of 
agencies in Germany, Belgium, Spain, Great Britain or Monaco; TransUnion competes in 
the Italian market and Equifax in the markets of Spain and Portugal (Kitchenman, 1999). 
Despite this competitive surrounding, the same concentration processes will be 
observable just as occurred in the US market. Jappelli and Pagano (2000a) expect a 
continental credit reporting system within the next five to ten years with two or three 
large credit bureaus operating on the European level. 
In Europe, the population coverage rates of private credit bureaus differ from about 
100% in Great Britain and Belgium to 78.6% (Ireland) to 62% (Germany) and, 
remarkably, to virtually no coverage in France (Jappelli and Pagano, 2000b, p. 29). The 
intensified competition in European credit reporting industries will lead to a higher 
coverage of population in the European credit markets and reveal considerable effects on 
the credit-granting industry.  
In the future, there will be the tendency to an oligopolistic market structure in Europe 
and to transnational reporting schemes, while at the same time the coverage rates will 
increase. If scoring services are also seen as a competitive advantage, we may observe a 
tendency to more detailed credit profiles, as far as the collection of positive information 
is allowed. Table 10 presents an overview of coverage rates. 
 
Table 10. Coverage rates of private credit bureaus  
Country  Year  Population* 
 
Credit reports 
stored (millions) 
Coverage rate, 
(rounded) 
United States   2000  275,423,000  270  100% 
Germany  2000  81,168,000  55  67% 
France  2000  60,431,000  n/a  n/a 
Great Britain  2000  59,756,000  60  100% 
* Population numbers are rounded and taken from the OECD (2002). THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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4.3.1 Germany 
In Germany, there is a central public credit register (Evidenzzentrale) administered by the 
central bank, Deutsche Bundesbank. This register was founded in 1934 after the Great 
Depression revealed the serious threats posed by systemic risk and the incomplete 
information of the creditors with respect to their borrowers. The exchange via the 
Evidenzzentrale is based on three acts: Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (KWG), Federal 
Data Protection Act and the guideline Verordnung über die Erfassung, Bemessung, 
Gewichtung und Anzeige von Krediten im Bereich der Großkredit- und 
Millionenkreditvorschriften des Gesetzes über das Kreditwesen (GroMiKV). Table 11 
below presents coverage rates for Germany and France. 
Table 11. Coverage rates of public credit registers (Germany and France)* 
Country  Year  Population 
 
Persons 
stored 
Coverage rate 
(%, rounded) 
Germany  1990  79,364,000  367,000  n/a 
  1991  79,984,000  413,000  n/a 
  1992  80,594,000  464,000  n/a 
  1993  81,179,000  200,000  n/a 
  1994  81,422,000  210,000  n/a 
  1995  81,661,000  233,000  n/a 
  1996  81,896,000  269,000  n/a 
  1997  82,052,000  295,000  n/a 
  1998  82,029,000  32,104  0.04 
  1999  82,087,000  42,888  0.05 
  2000  82,168,000  47,776  0.06 
France  1990  58,026,000  n/a  n/a 
  1991  58,315,000  633,686  1.09 
  1992  58,612,000  1,073,942  1.83 
  1993  58,896,000  1,360,000  2.31 
  1994  59,115,000  1,305,000  2.21 
  1995  59,326,000  1,198,318  2.07 
  1996  59,533,000  1,180,162  1.98 
  1997  59,735,000  1,184,447  1.98 
  1998  59,942,000  1,215,230  2.03 
  1999  60,156,000  1,376,520  2.29 
  2000  60,431,000  1,658,649  2.74 
* No public registries exist in the US or Great Britain. For Germany, persons stored refers to all 
borrowers (including firms) for 1990-98, from that year onwards only to private households. Data on 
private households before the year 1998 are not available. 
Sources: Population numbers are taken from OECD (2002), persons stored are from the Banque de 
France and the Deutsche Bundesbank  
 
All credit institutions and even some public administration offices in Germany are obliged 
to report borrowers who are indebted exceeding €1.5 million at any point in time during NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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the last quarter. Originally this threshold was 1 million DM (€0.5 million),
33 but to 
account for price increases and developments in the financial services industry, it was 
increased in 1993 by the fourth amendment to the KWG to 3 million DM and the number 
of companies that have to report also increased. In 2002, the threshold was altered to 
accommodate the Euro. Quarterly, all credit-granting institutions receive automatically 
references relating to the overall indebtedness of their clients. Private credit bureaus do 
not have access to the database, moreover, the Bundesbank states: “Wegen der hohen 
Meldegrenze und der im Vergleich zu privaten Kreditauskunfteien unterschiedlichen 
Zweckbestimmung steht die Evidenzzentrale der Deutschen Bundesbank nicht in 
Konkurrenz zu privaten Kreditauskunfteien (z.B. Schufa).” (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2002). Due to the high threshold for reporting, there is no direct competition with 
private credit bureaus. In Germany, we do not analyse the public credit register, since 
there are private credit bureaus in the market. The interested reader is referred to 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1998, 2001) and Estrella at al. (2000). 
Germany is dominated by one major private credit bureau, the Schufa Holding AG. 
Originally, the former Bundes-Schufa was an association with eight regional bureaus. In 
2000, the 61 Bundes-Schufa partners, mainly companies from the banking industry as 
well as the retail and mail order industry, decided to restructure the non-profit 
association as Schufa Holding AG (a for-profit company). The new legal entity is an 
answer to the increasing competition pressures. According to its 2000 business report, 
the company holds information on 55 million persons (Schufa Holding AG, 2001). In 
1997, it had a partnership with the Italian credit bureau CRIF in order to develop scoring 
solutions. The company has cross-border data exchange arrangements with three 
countries (Italy, Austria and the Netherlands). 
Another major player in the market is the Vereine Creditreform e.V. primarily providing 
business information.
34 In 1998, however, Creditreform founded a joint venture with 
Experian, the Creditreform Experian GmbH (CEG). This brought the company into 
direct competition with the Schufa Holding AG (Focus, 1998). Experian has been active 
in Germany for nearly ten years. In 1998, Experian also bought the Directmarketing 
GmbH (a data base of 28 million addresses). The latest acquisition of a company was 
Cards Direkt, a private label card processor in Germany which makes Experian the 
market leader in the processing of customer cards in Germany.  
Medium players in the markets are Bürgel Wirtschaftsinformationen (11 million private 
persons stored), Infoscore, and the Karstadt Quelle Infoservices, founded in 2000. 
Despite the dominant market player, there are also still small companies providing credit 
reporting services.  
4.3.2 Great Britain 
Great Britain’s market resembles that of the United States in that there is no public credit 
register administered by the central bank. However, the Registry Trust Ltd, an 
independent organisation that was established by the Lord Chancellor’s Department, 
                                                 
33 Reference exchange rates of 22 May 2002 (1€ = $0.926).  
34 In 1990, about 25% of their data sets were private borrowers (Ganßauge, 1995, p. 75).  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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holds the statutory register for all County Court judgements. The major credit bureaus 
are informed of judgements as well as of satisfactions and cancellations on a weekly 
basis. In Great Britain, the sharing of positive and negative data is also allowed as long 
as the consumer has provided his or her informed consent.  
As we will see, even within the European context, there are major differences in the 
attitude towards the collection of negative and positive data. The British Task Force on 
Tackling Overindebtedness (located at the Department of Trade and Industry) proposes: 
“Lenders should seek to share all currently permissible data, both positive and negative, 
with other lenders. This should include outstanding credit balances, credit limits, open 
credit lines, history of repayments and amounts borrowed” (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2001, p. 35). At the same time, the Task Force encourages all non-credit 
organisations which regularly take payments from consumers to register those (as well as 
the defaults) with the credit reference agencies.  
Concerning competition, it seems like there is much more merger and acquisition activity 
in Great Britain, than in Germany, for example. Since the beginning of the 1990s, a 
number of takeovers have taken place. Just like in the US, there is an oligopolistic 
market structure with three dominant players, Callcredit Plc, Equifax Plc and Experian 
Ltd.  
In 2001, the industry witnessed the creation of a new, web-based credit reference 
agency, a partnership between the American D&B and the British Skipton Building 
Society (Callcredit Plc). At the beginning of its operations, this company held credit files 
on 44 million customers in Great Britain (Callcredit, 2002), and the company intended to 
achieve 60 million records by the end of 2001 (Callcredit, 2001, p. 5).  
Another US-based company, Equifax, was also very active in the British market. The 
company not only bought four other firms (UATP Infolink, Grattan, Check-a-Cheque 
and CCI Group Plc), it also invested in founding Equifax Card Solutions. In 1994, 
Equifax won the bidding war for UATP Infolink against TransUnion which was also 
interested in buying this company. In 1999, the Office of Fair Trading gave the green 
light to the acquisition of a minority stake in the company Choicepoint.  
Experian, originally the US-based TRW Information Systems and Services that merged 
in 1996 with the American Direct Marketing Technology and the British CCN Group to 
become Experian. Shortly after the merger, this company was bought by British retail 
conglomerate Great Universal Stores Plc (GUS), a holding company that includes home 
shopping, retail, property investment finance and information services. GUS spent $1.7 
billion for this acquisition. In the following year, Experian remained on an expansion 
course by acquiring the companies ICD and CCN Group as well as other companies. 
Experian has its headquarters in both Great Britain and the US.  
4.3.3 France 
France is a special case. It stands in stark contrast to the other surveyed countries, 
because France has developed a different system of reporting that is presumably 
influenced by a more centralist approach. The major player in the credit reporting NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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industry is the Banque de France which hosts different kinds of national databases 
(FNCI, FICP, FCC and FIBEN), which serve various purposes.
35 In the context of our 
study, the data base called National Register of Household Credit Repayment Incidents 
(Fichier National des Incidents de Remboursement des Crédits aux Particuliers, FICP) is 
particularly relevant. The FICP was created by the Neiertz Act (Act on Preventing and 
Resolving Personal Debt Problems) in 1989, whose details are described in the regulation 
90-05 of 11 April 1990. Moreover, the FICP is governed by the 1978 Act on Data 
Processing, Data Files and Individual Liberties.
36  
The 1989 act expanded the authority of the CRBF by mandating the creation and 
regulation of a national data base on repayment incidents by households. It has the 
purpose of centralising as well as distributing two kinds of “reports”: 1) effective 
incidents in connection with credits granted to individuals for non-professional purposes; 
and 2) repayment schedules drawn up by the French overindebtedness commissions 
outside court-settlement procedures as well as recommendations after judicial review 
(Banque de France, 2001b, p. 6). The credit institutions are free to consult the FICP, but 
access is granted only to credit institutions, the financial service business of the La 
Poste,
37 overindebtedness commissions and the judicial authorities (Banque de France, 
1994, p. 102). In turn, it is obligatory for the financial institutions to report the 
information to the central register (Banque de France, 1994, p. 101). This means that the 
French system can be characterised as an exclusive reporting scheme that allows only the 
aforementioned institutions to use the information (Code de Consommation, Art. L. 333-
4). Moreover, the financial institutions are not allowed to transfer the reports in any form 
whatsoever (Banque de France, 2002a, p. 5). Table 11 presents the coverage rates.  
What kind of data is collected? The files contain the identity of the borrowers (i.e. 
private persons), incidents on all types of credit granted (for non-professional purposes), 
including overdrafts and repayment schedules drawn up by overindebtedness 
commissions in out-of-court settlements (Banque de France, 2001b, p. 6). The Banque 
de France has the sole right of collecting information on judicial measures, except for 
cases in which the financial institution is directly involved in the case.  
The threshold for incidents and overdrafts is about €457 (Banque de France, 2002b). It 
was changed in 1996, when the Banque de France increased it from 1,000 FF to 3,000 
FF. An incident is not reported to the Banque de France until one month has passed, 
since this period could allow the borrower to rectify his or her situation. If no solution is 
found or if the liability remains unpaid, then it is mandatory to report the incident to the 
Banque de France. However, the subject of the report is informed of this inscription by 
the reporting institution (Banque de France, 2002a, p. 3).  
                                                 
35 These abbreviations stand for the following: Fichier National des Chèques Irréguliers (FNCI), Fichier 
National des Incidents de Remboursement des Crédits aux Particuliers (FICP), Fichier Centrales des 
Chèques (FCC) and Fichier Bancaire des Entreprises (FIBEN). The data base of interest is the FICP. 
36 The predecessor of FICP was the Centrale Professionelle d’Information sur les Impayés (CPII), 
administrated by the Association des Sociétés Financières (ASF). It was the subject of a declaration 
before the CNIL in 1989, but it is not used anymore. This exchange ended in the mid-1990s.  
37 La Poste is a postal service provider in France, which also provides financial services.  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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The information is listed for different time spans. In the past, these periods have changed 
several times. Originally, judicial measures and repayment plans were stored for three 
years without erasure in case of repayment (Banque de France, 1994, p. 102). In 1993, 
The CRBF decided to extend that period to five years (Banque de France, 2002a, p. 3). 
In 2000, the CRBF issued a new regulation that expanded the period once more, now 
repayment plans are stored for eight years (Règlement no. 2000-04 du septembre 2000).  
In 2001, 6% of the stored incidents were mortgage credit incidents, while 94% were 
incidents concerning consumer credit (Banque de France, 2002b). There are five 
characteristics of the registered FICP reports that are described more precisely by the 
Banque de France (1994). The file is legal, since it establishes a homogenous system of 
access. It is presumably non-monopolistic, since the individual creditors can hold their 
own internal files, but the FICP database is national and administrated officially. The 
reason for this is explained as follows: “Cet ancrage public se justifie par les garanties 
d’objectivité et d’impartialité de l’Institut d’émission et par son expérience en matière 
de gestion de grands fichiers nationaux (…)” (Banque de France, 1994, p. 99). Another 
central characteristic is the exclusive collection of negative data – only payment incidents 
are stored. Concerning the system, the Banque de France states: “Il ne fonctionne donc 
pas, à la différence de ce qui est observés dans la plupart des pays européens, comme 
une centrale de risques recensant l’endettement général des particuliers mais comme 
une centrale d’incidents” (Banque de France, 1994, p. 99).  
It is important to note that there is no direct legal prohibition of positive information-
sharing, but there exists the principle that positive files were not included in the 1989 act. 
Only if the law explicitly authorised the collection and distribution would this be allowed. 
The Banque the France writes: “Le législateur, lors du vote de la loi No. 98-1010 du 31 
décembre 1989 relative à la prévention et au règlement des difficultés liées au 
surendettement des particuliers et des familles, n’a pas souhaité constituer un fichier 
positif recesant les crédits. Il a préféré créer le FICP qui est un fichier négatif et de 
confier la gestion à la Banque de France.” (Banque de France, 2002b). Another 
important aspect explains the French system. The CNIL is also convinced that positive 
information is more susceptible to being diverted from its original purpose than is 
negative information, since the richness of the information tempts the collector to use it 
for purposes other than the ones originally stated. It may not be so important whether 
positive information is collected, but what is important is the fact that once it is 
collected, it is quite difficult to return to a negative-only system (Leclercq, 2000, p. 20).  
Another problem is that of legitimate access to positive information, since the borrower 
is normally not defaulting and does not produce an incident. And in comparison to Great 
Britain, the CNIL writes: “Ainsi le taux d’impayés au Royaume-Uni qui dispose 
pourtant de deux centrales ‘positives’ est de même niveau qu’en France” (Leclercq, 
2000, p. 20). This argument also holds in case of the United States, as explicitly stated 
by the CNIL: it is 1.5% in France compared to 4-5% in the United States (Leclercq, 
2000, p. 3).  
A working group in the French Senat expressed consent in refusing positive information. 
However, the same group states that it is important to improve the FICP (Senat, 1997). 
The group states that FICP files could be enlarged to include unpaid taxes, unpaid bills 
registered by French telecommunication providers and unpaid premiums registered by NICOLA JENTZSCH 
 44 
the French insurance industry. “Le groupe de travail est convaincu qu’ainsi enrichi, le 
ficher actuel gagnerait en efficacité” (Senat, 1997).  
In the case of an enlargement of files, however, there would be the question of access 
authorisation for other information providers than the credit institutions.  
And yet another question is how to finance the system. “Le coût du fichier actuel, soit 
16.5 millions de francs par an, est réparti par la Banque de France entre les 
établissements de crédits en fonction de leur part dans les encours de crédits” (Senat, 
1997). If other parties participate in the system, these industries would also bear a part of 
the costs.  
Private companies collecting data in France belong to the marketing industry (Claritas, 
Consodata and Cofinoga) or the business reporting industry (Bürgel, D&B, Graydon). 
There are three credit reporting agencies in the market (Experian, Equifax and CRIF), 
but they do not provide credit reporting services. These companies are active in the field 
of cheque-processing or provide risk-management products to the financial industry. It is 
important to note that the outsourcing of file management is allowed, but only for 
internal uses (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, 2002). 
Nevertheless, there is some activity in the French market. For instance, in 1998, Experian 
bought the card and cheque processing firm SG2 from the Société Générale. A year 
later, the company also bought DMC Informatique, another check processing firm. 
Experian collects information on individuals as well as on companies and sells scoring 
services as well as other risk-management products to the financial industry in France 
(Experian, 2001, p. 5). Concerning credit reporting, the company verifies credit demands 
of individuals by analysing their annual telephone bills, the files of the postal service (in 
case of a move) and the files of its clients. Experian states: “Experian héberge le système 
d’information ‘bases des impayés’ constitué par les sociétés commerciales et les 
opérateurs de téléphonie mobile français” (Experian, 2002b).  
In 2001, Experian bought a minority stake in CNTP, a check-processing subsidiary of 
the company Setip (which is the IT service operation of the France Telecom). The 
company now operates under the name CNTP Experian. As mentioned, positive 
information-reporting is not directly forbidden by law in France, but since positive files 
are excluded from the aforementioned legislation, it is assumed that their collection is not 
allowed. Therefore, the CNIL does not authorise such information collection. This is the 
reason why there is no privately organised credit reporting service in France. The FICP 
coverage rates tended to be rather small in the second half of the 1990s, about 2.2% of 
the total population.  
4.4 International Cooperation  
The credit reporting industry is increasingly cooperating on a national as well as on an 
international level. The major organisation in the US is the Consumer Data Industry 
Association (CDIA) (the former ACB) founded in 1906, which has 500 members (credit 
reporting companies, but also mortgage reporting, employment reporting or collection 
service companies). In 1992, the independent credit reporting agencies founded the 
National Credit Reporting Association (NCRA) in Illinois. The intention of this 
organisation of more than 100 members is to “achieve a reasonable balance within the THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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industry” (National Credit Reporting Association, 1999). In Europe, the first 
international association is the European Association of Consumer Credit Information 
Suppliers (ACCIS), representing 21 consumer credit reference agencies from 14 different 
European countries.  
The public credit registers, on the other hand, work together in the Working Group on 
Credit Registers (WGCR), which brings together representatives from the central 
registers in Europe, including Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal and 
Spain and representatives of the European Central Bank. This Working Group is chaired 
by Germany and belongs to the Banking Supervision Committee of the European System 
of Central Banks.  
The group is charged with preparing the organisation and technical procedures for trans-
national data exchange between the public registers. In February 2003, the group 
finalised a Memorandum of Understanding that constitutes the foundation of pan-
European data exchange between public registries. It is intended to create a reporting 
system that allows data exchange on a regular basis. The credit register of country A 
would receive information from the registers in other participating countries on each of 
its borrowers who also has debt in other European countries (Deutsche Bundesbank, 
2002). National financial institutions, on the other hand, are supposed to gain access to 
borrower information of other countries via their home credit register.  
It is important to note that even in mid-2002, only a few countries (Belgium, Italy, 
Portugal and Germany) had laws in effect that allow the transnational exchange among 
public credit registers (Deutsche Bank, 2002). Bilateral agreements allowing regular 
information exchange among the public European credit registers did not exist at that 
time. In a first step, the registers agreed on exchanging information in single cases, but 
for supervision purposes only. Therefore, the data are not transferred to financial 
institutions (Deutsche Bundesbank, 2002).  
In 1998, ACCIS and CDIA (then ACB) founded the Consumer Credit Reporting World 
Committee (CCRWC) during the first Consumer Credit Reporting World Conference in 
Rome. This forum is intended to monitor critical developments in the countries and to 
organise formal meetings. In this association, European and American credit bureaus are 
joined by bureaus from Asia and Africa. Transnational reporting in Europe is at the 
beginning of its development and is organised via different information networks, for 
example the BIGNet (users exchange business information), Eurogate (an information 
network of reporting companies in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Great Britain) 
and EurisConnect (a network among several European credit bureaus that provide a 
European standard report on consumer credit profiles). Behind the latter stand Schufa 
Holding AG and CRIF, which have jointly developed a “key factor system” that is 
intended to translate the different reporting standards in a universal language.  
It has to be noted that cross-border data exchange is largely underdeveloped among 
member states. Only Anglo-Saxon companies have established international networks 
(their “intranets”). The underdeveloped cross-border exchange in Europe can be 
explained by supply- and demand-side restraints: on the supply side, the national focus of 
credit reporting agencies hinders a quicker development of cross-border reporting, but 
on the demand side, there seems to be a lack of demand from banks for credit reports on NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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foreign borrowers. The latter is a reason why credit reporting agencies have primarily not 
developed transnational reporting schemes to date. 
5. Conclusions 
On both sides of the Atlantic, information sharing regimes in consumer credit markets 
are currently under review. In Europe, policy-makers are discussing a new proposal of a 
directive for consumer credit that mandates member states to operate negative registries, 
among other provisions. In the United States, key provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act are under scrutiny, since they expire by the end of 2003. These legislative changes 
will have large-scale effects on consumer credit markets and the information structure in 
these markets. For these reasons, the economic dimension of financial privacy has to be 
understood in a more comprehensive way.  
With the approach presented in this study, it is possible to show the differences between 
data protection regimes in the US and Europe (with the reference countries Germany, 
Great Britain and France) and to analyse the correlations of broader access to consumer 
credit and increasing consumer indebtedness on both sides of the Atlantic. The Financial 
Privacy Index was applied in order to rate the US and the EU according to their 
regulatory regimes. Four fields were examined: supervisory authority, the rights of data 
subjects, the obligations of credit bureaus and judicial remedies and enforcement. The 
legal analysis of functional similarities showed that the US remains below EU levels in 
terms of data protection regulations, and that within the EU, France provides the highest 
number of such regulations. In addition, the changing values of the index in our time 
series indicate the dynamic convergence of European regimes to a higher level of data 
protection.  
The author also conducted statistical tests to analyse the economic effects that are 
associated with different data protection regimes. As stated, the purpose of the study 
was not to choose one of the privacy regimes as a first-best solution. Only a more 
differentiated view allows policy-makers to take the positive as well as the negative 
economic consequences of data protection into account.  
The statistical tests of the economic effects of more stringent data protection regimes 
revealed interesting insights, some of which were even counter-intuitive. In the individual 
countries, an increasing Financial Privacy Index is not associated with lower information 
allocation, but rather with higher allocation. However, the international comparison 
showed that countries with higher data protection are in general associated with lower 
information allocation when compared to other countries. It holds that the more credit 
reports are sold, the higher the access is to credit. This is certainly a positive effect. 
However, increased access to credit is also correlated with increased consumer 
indebtedness and in addition, consumer credit risk rises. This was explained by stating 
that credit may be extended to households that are marginally a higher credit risk.  
Our discussion of competition in the credit reporting industry focused on the 
characteristics of networked information markets and the inherent concentration 
processes. The review of the latest developments showed that there is significant merger 
and acquisition activity in Europe, primarily driven by Anglo-Saxon companies. This will 
lead to only three or four transnational credit bureaus or reporting networks with THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
 47 
associated companies. This intensification will have a positive effect on the efficient 
provision of information to the financial service providers. However, the EU still lacks 
cross-border data exchange, which will be one of the crucial preconditions of an 
integrated consumer credit market. The proposed directive on consumer credit should 
therefore pursue the standardisation of European credit reporting systems. Since there 
are large scale and scope effects existent in credit reporting markets, increased efficiency 
can be achieved via national, unified standards. This also holds for the US market, where 
it is currently discussed if certain provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act should be 
left to state legislators.  
Moreover, in the EU, the Commission should refrain from drawing up another directive 
that explicitly deals with consumer credit information. The Financial Privacy Indices 
imply that the process and speed of transposition is unequal, leading to increased 
uncertainty for consumers and the industry.  
European policy-makers need to find an economically reasonable balance between the 
positive and negative effects of increasing exchange of personal information about 
borrowers. This study shows that this exchange is not really inhibited by privacy 
regulations in the individual countries. However, if access to credit is expanded across 
borders, European policy-makers also need instruments to constantly monitor the 
market. For this crucial surveillance Europe needs common definitions and procedures of 
bankruptcy and over-indebtedness. If cross-border exchange is to be facilitated, 
European policy-makers should ensure the transparency of this exchange for consumers. 
This will be of utmost importance to increase confidence in a common European 
consumer credit market.   48 
REFERENCES 
Allen, B. (1990), “Information as an Economic Commodity”, American Economic 
Review, 80 (2), pp. 268-273. 
American Banker (1993), “Smaller Credit Bureaus Unite Against Big Three”, The 
American Banker, 29, p. 10.  
Arthur, B.W. (1990), “Positive Feedbacks in the Economy”, Scientific American, 292, 
pp. 92-99.  
———— (1994), “Positive Feedbacks in the New Economy”, McKinsey Quarterly, 1, 
pp. 81-95. 
Azcuenaga, M.L. (1991), “Pre-screening under the Fair Credit Reporting Act and other 
Issues that Affect Credit Bureaus”, unpublished speech (January 17, 1991), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/azcuenaga/ma11791.pdf  
Banisar, D. (2000), An International Survey of Privacy Laws and Developments, Privacy 
International, www.privacyinternational.org   
Banque de France (1994), “Le Bilan du Fichier national des incidents de remboursement 
des crédits aux particulièrs”, Bulletin de la Banque de France, 9, pp. 99-104.  
———— (1995), “Évolution de l’activité des fichiers d’incidents gérés par la Banque 
des France”, Bulletin de la Banque de France, No. 15 (March), pp. 123-126.  
———— (1996), Annual Report 1996, Paris.  
———— (1998), Annual Report 1998, Paris.  
———— (2000a), Annual Report 2000, Paris.  
———— (2000b), Règlement No. 2000-04 du 6 septembre 2000 modifiant le règlement 
No. 90-05 du 11 avril 1990 relatif au fichier national des incidents de reboursement 
des crédits aus particulièrs (FICP), http://www.banque-
france.fr/fr/infobafi/regles/6_2004.htm 
———— (2001a), The French Central Credit Register, Fact Sheet No. 115 (August).  
———— (2001b), Over-indebtedness of Individuals, Fact Sheet No. 119 (August).  
———— (2002a), Le Fichier National des Incidents de Remboursement des Crédits aux 
Particuliers, Note d’Information No. 129. 
———— (2002b), Letter to the author, dated June 18.  
Barr, L.B. and B.J. Ellis (1999), “The New FCRA: An Assessment of the First Year”, 
The Business Lawyer, 54, pp. 1343-1354.  
Barron, J.M. and M. Staten (2000), “The Value of Comprehensive Credit Reports: 
Lessons from the US Experience”, in M. Miller (ed.), Credit Reporting Systems 
and the International Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
www.privacyalliance.org/resources/staten.pdf 
Bennett, C. (1992), Regulating Privacy – Data Protection and Public Policy in Europe 
and the United States, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.. 
Besen, S.M. and J. Farrell (1994), “Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardisation”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8 (2), pp. 117-131.  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
 49 
Boehmer, R.G. (2000), “A Comparison of US Privacy Laws with the European Data 
Protection Directive”, in Lehner, Franz and Ronald Maier (eds), Electronic 
Business and Multimedia, Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitätsverband.  
Bostic, R. and P. Calem (forthcoming), “Privacy Restrictions and the Use of Data at 
Credit Registries”, in M. Miller (ed.), Credit Reporting Systems and the 
International Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
Boyes, W.J., D. Hoffman and S. Low (1986), “Lender Reactions to Information 
Restrictions: The Case of Banks and the ECOA”, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, 18 (2), pp. 211-219.    
Brooker, P. (1998), “Experian Expands with Major Acquisition in France”, M2 
Presswire (Feb. 3).  
Brühann, U. (1998), “The International Scene and the EU Directive: 5 Weeks before Its 
Entry Into Force”, Presentation, Rome.  
———— (2000), “Privacy, the EU and the Processing of Financial Data”, Presentation, 
San Francisco.  
Bundesbeauftragter für Datenschutz (1998), BfD-Info 1 – Bundesdatenschutzgesetz – 
Text und Erläuterung, Bonn.  
———— (1999), BfD-Info 2 – Der Buerger und seine Daten, Bonn.  
———— (2001), Datenschutz von A-Z, Index, www.bfd.bund.de/dsvonaz/a14.html  
———— (2002), BfD-Info 1 – Bundesdatenschutzgesetz – Text und Erläuterung, 
Bonn.  
Bürgel (2002), Und wie vermeiden Sie finanzielle Verluste?, 
http://www.buergel.de/wirtschaftsauskuenfte.html  
Callcredit (2002), About us - Overview, http://www.callcredit.plc.uk  
———— (2001), Introducing Share, Creditlines, No. 1 (October).  
Carey, P. and C. Russell (2000), Data Protection in the UK, London: Oxford University 
Press.  
Cate, F. (2001), The Privacy Avalanche, 76th Annual Winter Newspaper Institute North 
Carolina Press Association, 
http://www.cspra.org/csprasite/pdfs/privacyparadox.pdf  
Chandler, G.G. and L.E. Parker (1989), “Predictive Value of Credit Bureau Reports,” 
Journal of Retail Banking, XI (4), pp. 47-54. 
Coase, R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost”, The Journal of Law and Economics, 
III, pp. 1-44. 
Cole, R.H. (1992), Consumer and Commercial Credit Management (Irwin, 
Homewood). 
CoolSavings, Inc. (2001), CoolsSavings, Inc. Appoints David Arney Chief Financial 
Officer, press release (October 10), PR Newswire Association, Chicago.  
Commission National de l’Informatique et des Libertés (CNIL) (1978), Décret no. 78-
774 du 17 juillet 1978, Official Journal (July), www.cnil.fr/textes/text061.htm  
———— (1980), Arrêté du 23 Septembre, Official Journal (October), 
http://www.cnil.fr/textes/docs/a2309801a.pdf  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
 50 
———— (1982), Décret no. 82-525 du 16 juin 1982 relatif à la redevance prévue à 
l'article 35 (alinéa 2) de la loi no. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l'informatique, 
aux fichiers et aux libertés, Official Journal (Juin), 
http://www.cnil.fr/textes/docs/825251a.pdf 
———— (1988), Déliberation no. 88-083 du juillet 1988 portant adoption d’une 
recommandation relative á la gestion des crédits ou des prêts consentis à des 
personnes physiques par les établissements de crédit, Official Journal (August), 
http://www.cnil.fr/textes/docs/recomand/880831a.pdf  
———— (1998a), 18ème Rapport (1997), Paris.  
———— (1998b), Déliberation no. 98-101 du décembre 1998 portant modification de 
la recommandation relative à la gestion des crédits ou des prêts consentis à des 
personnes physiques par les établissements de crédit, Official Journal (January), 
No. 22, Paris.  
———— (1999a), 19ème Rapport (1998), Paris.  
———— (1999b), Electronic Mailing and Data Protection, Paris.  
———— (2000), 20ème Rapport (1999), Paris.  
———— (2001), 21e Rapport d’activité 2000, Paris.  
———— (2002), Mail to the author, dated May 30, 2002.  
Consumer Data Industry Association (2002), website: http://www.cdiaonline.org/  
Council of Europe (2001a), Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding 
supervisory authorities and transborder data flows (ETS No. 181), Strasbourg, 
http://conventions.coe.int/  
———— (2001b), Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108) Explanatory Report, 
Strasbourg http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html/108.htm  
———— (2002), Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108) – Status as of 03/05/2002, Strasbourg 
, http://conventions.coe.int/  
David, P. (1985), “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY”, American Economic Review, 
75, pp. 332-337. 
Dell’Ariccia, G. (2001), “Asymmetric information and the structure of the banking 
industry”, European Economic Review, 40, pp. 1957-1980.  
Deutsche Bundesbank (1998), “Die Evidenzzentrale für Millionenkredite bei der 
Deutschen Bundesbank – Änderungen im Meldeverfahren”, Deutsche Bundesbank 
Monatsbericht, 50 (8), pp. 83-91.  
———— (2001), Deutschen Bundesbank Geschäftsbericht 2001, Frankfurt am Main, 
pp. 176-181.  
———— (2002), Letter to the author, dated June 7.  
Department of Trade and Industry (2000), The Consumer Credit (Credit Reference 
Agency) Regulations 2000, Statutory Instrument 2000, No. 290, 
www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si20000/20000290.htm  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
 51 
———— (2001), Report by the Task Force on Tackling Overindebtedness, Consumer 
Affaires Directorate, London.  
Economides, N. (1993), “Network Economics with Application to Finance”, Financial 
Markets, Institutions Instruments, 2 (5), pp. 89-97. 
———— (1996), “The Economics of Networks”, International Journal of Industrial 
Organisation, 14, pp. 673-699. 
———— (2001), “The Impact of the Internet on Financial Markets”, Journal of 
Financial Transformation, 1 (1), pp. 8-13. 
Electronic Information Report (1999), “Leading Credit Info. Providers Look to Retain 
Growth in 1999”, Electronic Information Report, 20 (34), 2.  
Eichhorn, W. and J. Voeller (1983), “Axiomatic Foundation of Price Indices and 
Purchasing Power Parities”, in W.E. Diewert and C. Montmarquette (eds), Price 
Level Measurement (Statistics Canada, Ottawa), pp. 1049-1113.  
Eurostat (1998), “Statistische Güterklassifikation in Verbindung mit den 
Wirtschaftszweigen”, in der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft CPA 1996, 
Brussels.  
European Commission (1997), First Annual Report, Brussels.  
———— (1998a), Second Annual Report, Brussels.  
———— (1998b), Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries: Applying Article 25 
and 26 of the EU Data Protection Directive, Working Document, Brussels. 
———— (1998c), Existing Case-Law on Compliance with Data Protection Laws and 
Principles in the Member States of the European Union, Interim Report, Brussels.  
———— (1998d), Preparation of a Methodology for Evaluating the Adequacy of the 
Level of Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data, 
Brussels.  
———— (1998e), Application of a Methodology Designed to Assess the Adequacy of 
the Level of Protection of Individuals with Regard to Processing Personal Data: 
Test of the Method on Several Categories of Transfer, Final Report, Brussels.  
———— (1999), Third Annual Report on the Situation Regarding the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and Privacy in the 
Community and in Third Countries, Brussels. 
———— (2000) Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 – Pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the 
protection provided by the safe harbour privacy principles and related frequently 
asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, (2000/520/EC), 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/dataprot/adequacy/dec2000520ec.pd
f  
———— (2001), Fourth Annual Report on the Situation Regarding the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and Privacy in the 
Community and in Third Countries, Brussels.  
———— (2002), Fifth Annual Report on the Situation Regarding the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and Privacy in the 
European Union and in Third Countries, Brussels.  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
 52 
Eurostat (2002a), EU trade relations with the 12 Mediterranean Partner Countries 
(MED), News Release No. 32/2002, March 15, 2002 
Eurostat (2002b), EU trade and investment with Mediterranean Partner Countries: 
towards a better partnership, Statistics in Focus, Theme 2, 13/2002 Experian 
(1996), SEC Form S-1 Registration Statement und the Securities Act of 1933, 
www.sec.gov 
Estrella, A. et al. (2000), Credit Ratings and Complementary Sources of Credit Quality 
Information, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers, 3 
(August).  
Experian (1996), Form S-1 Registration Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.   
———— (2001), Dossier de Presse, http://www.experian.fr  
———— (2002a), Historique Complet, http://www.sg2.fr/france/about.htm  
———— (2002b), Experian: Spécialiste mondial des services d’information, 
http://www.experian.fr/offres/offres.htm  
———— (2002c), “Experian Announces Acquisition of AQM Information Solutions, 
Inc. and other Affiliate Credit Bureaus”, Press Release (September 12, 2002), 
http://www.gusplc.com/template_press.asp?filename=266&divisionname=Experian 
Federal Trade Commission (1972), “The Fair Credit Reporting Act – A Check List for 
Consumers”, Consumer Bulletin, No. 7, Washington, D.C.  
———— (1997), Notices of Rights and Duties under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 16 
CFR Part 601, www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/2-fedreg.htm  
———— (1999), Credit Reports: What Information Providers Need to Know, FTC 
Facts for Businesses, Washington, D.C.  
———— (2000a), Privacy of Consumer Financial Information; Final Rule, Federal 
Register 65 (101), Washington, D.C. 
———— (2000b), “FTC Issues Final Rule on Privacy of Consumer Financial 
Information”, Press Release, May 15.  
———— (2000c), “Nation’s Big Three Consumer Reporting Agencies Agree To Pay 
$2.5 million To Settle Charges of Violating Fair Credit Reporting Act”, Press 
Release, January 13. 
———— (2001), The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act – Privacy of Consumer Financial 
Information, presentation, Washington, D.C. 
———— (2002), The Fair Credit Reporting Act, Washington, D.C., 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcrajan2002.pdf  
Federal Register (2000), Part III Federal Trade Commission, 16 CFR 13 – Privacy of 
Consumer Financial Information, Final Rule, Washington, D.C.  
Fickenscher, L. (1999). “Experian, not just a Credit Bureau, Emerges as Data Base 
Powerhouse”, The American Banker, 164 (64), pp. 1-4.  
Fischer, R.L. and M.F. McEneney (1997), “Fair Credit Reforms: Relief and 
Responsibility for Banks”, Banker’s Magazine, 180 (2), pp. 5-13.  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
 53 
Focus (1998), “Gläserner Kunde in der Datenbank”, Focus Magazin, May 30, No. 23, p.  
264.  
France, E. (1995), Guidance Notes On Credit Referencing, www.dataprotection.gov.uk 
/dpframe/cont.htm  
Ganßauge, K. (1995), Datenverarbeitung und – Nutzung von Kreditwürdigkeitsdaten 
durch fremdnützige Verarbeiter, Schriften zum Recht des Informationsverkehrs 11, 
Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.  
Glassman, C. (2000), Customer Benefits from Current Information-sharing by Financial 
Services Companies, Ernst & Young LLP, 
http://www.privacyalliance.org/resources/glassman.pdf  
Goode, R.M. (1974), Consumer Credit Act 1974, Butterworths: London.  
Groupement Francais de l’Industrie de l’Information (2000), Réunions, débats, colloques 
année 2000, http://www.gfii.asso.fr/reunion2.htm#convergence  
———— (2001), Logiques et enjeux de la concentration dans le secteur de 
l’information professionnelle, http://www.gfii.asso.fr/concentration.htm  
Hahn, R.W. and J.A. Hird (1991), “The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Review and 
Synthesis”, Yale Journal of Regulation, 8, pp. 233-278.  
Home Office (2000), Consumer Credit (Credit Reference Agency) Regulations 2000, SI 
2000, No. 290, London.  
Jappelli, T. and M. Pagano (2000a), “Information-sharing, Lending and Defaults: Cross-
Country Evidence”, Working Paper (October), http://www.banque-
france.fr/gb/fondatio/papers/discuss/shar_old.htm  
———— (2000b), “Information-sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience”, 
CSEF Working Paper No. 35 (March). 
Jentzsch, N. (2003a), “The Implications of the New Consumer Credit Directive for EU 
Market Integration”, position paper for Hearing of the EU Parliament, 29 April, 
http://www.europarl.eu.int/hearings/20030429/juri/jentzsch1_en.pdf 
Jentzsch, N. (2003b), Scoring, Rating and Indexing: A Discussion of the Measurement 
of Socio-Economics Environments, Draft, http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/~jentzsch/ 
Jentzsch, N. (forthcoming), The Regulatory Environment for Business Information 
Sharing, draft available from the author upon request.   
Jentzsch, N. and A. San José Riestra (2003), “Information Sharing and Its Implications 
for Consumer Credit Markets: United States vs. Europe”, Working Paper prepared 
for the European University Institute Workshop on Consumer Credit,  
http://www.iue.it/FinConsEU/may2003papers/ajenzsch.pdf 
Jonard, N. and M. Yildizoglu (1998), “Interaction of Local Interactions: Localised 
Learning and Network Externalities”, in P. Cohendet et al. (eds), The Economics 
of Networks, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 189-205. 
Kirman, A. (1997), “The Economy as Evolving Network”, Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics, 7, pp. 3399-3353.  
Kitchenman, W.F. and Diego Teixeira (1998), “Bureaus Do a Credible Job”, The 
Banker, 198 (867), pp. 104-106.  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
 54 
Kitchenman, W. (1999), “US Credit Reporting: Perceived Benefits Outweigh Privacy 
Concerns”, Paper (TowerGroup, Needham).  
La Porta et al. (1997), “Legal Determinants of External Finance”, The Journal of 
Finance, 52 (3), pp. 1131-1151.  
Laudon, K.C. (1996), “Markets and Privacy”, Communications of the ACM 39 (9), pp. 
92–104. 
Leclercq, P. (2000), “Crédit a la consommation – prévention de la fraude et des 
impayés”, Paris.  
Lee, W.A. (2002a), “Credit-Reporter-as-Adviser Wave Adds TransUnion”, The 
American Banker, 167 (91), pp. 8-12. 
———— (2002b), “Fair, Isaac Taps Institutions for Credit Score Distribution”, The 
American Banker, 167 (67), p. 1.  
Lutterbeck, B. (1998), “20 Jahre Dauerkonflikt: Die Novellierung des 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetzes”, in Bettina Sokol (ed.), 20 Jahre Datenschutz – 
Individualismus oder Gemeinschaftssinn?, Düsseldorf.  
Litan, R.E. and P.P. Swire (1998), None of Your Business: World Data Flows, 
Electronic Commerce, and the European Privacy Directive, Brookings Press, 
Washington, D.C. 
Madsen, W. (1992), Handbook of Personal Data Protection, New York.  
Maki, D.M. (2000). The Growth of Consumer Credit and the Household Debt Service 
Burden, Working Paper, Washington, D.C. 
Maurer, V.G. and R.E. Thomas (1997), “Getting Credit Where Credit is Due: Proposed 
Changes in the Fair Credit Reporting Act”, American Business Law Journal, 34 
(4), pp. 607-661.  
Marquez, R. (2002), “Competition, Adverse Selection, and Information Dispersion in the 
Banking Industry”, Review of Financial Studies, 15 (3), pp. 901-926. 
Masons (2002), The Growth of Credit Referencing – Privacy Threat or Necessity?, Data 
Protection and Privacy Commissioners Conference Report, www.masons.com  
Mellors, C. and D. Pollitt (1984), Legislating for Privacy: Data Protection in Western 
Europe, Parliamentary Affairs 37, pp. 195-211. 
Miller, M. (forthcoming), “Credit Reporting Systems around the Globe: The State of the 
Art in Public and Private Credit Registries”, in M. Miller (ed.), Credit Reporting 
Systems and the International Economy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mierzwinski, E. (2001), Examination of Existing Federal Statutes Addressing 
Information Privacy, Hearing, 
http://www.pirg.org/consumer/privacy/mierzwinski.pdf  
Mitrou, E. (1993), Die Entwicklung der institutionellen Kontrolle des Datenschutzes, 
Baden-Baden.  
Murphy, N.B. (1980), “Economies of Scale in the Cost of Compliance with Consumer 
Credit Protection Laws: The Case of the Implementation of the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1974”, Journal of Bank Research, No. 10, pp. 248-240.  
National Credit Reporting Association (1999), Our History and Future, Website 
www.ncrainc.org/about.htm  THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
 55 
Nelson, R.R. and S.G. Winter (1982), An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  
OECD (2002), Main Economic Indicators, Paris. 
Office for National Statistics (2002), Standard Industrial Classification of Economic 
Activities 1992, http://www.statistics.gov  
Office of Fair Trading (2002), personal communication to the author.  
Official Journal (1995), Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the 
Processing of Personal Data and of the Free Movement of such Data, L 281 
(23/11/1995), pp. 0031-0050.  
Padilla, J. and M. Pagano (1997), “Endogenous Communication among Lenders and 
Entrepreneurial Incentives”, Review of Financial Studies, 10 (1), pp. 205-236.  
Pagano, M. and T. Jappelli (1993), “Information-sharing in Credit Markets”, Journal of 
Finance, XLVIII (5), pp. 1693-1718. 
Perine, K. (2001), Judges Approve FTC Restrictions on the Use of Consumer Data, The 
Industry Standard, 7 May, http://www.thestandard.com  
Pincus, L.B. and R. Johns (1997), “Private Parts: A Global Analysis of Privacy 
Protection Schemes and a Proposed Innovation for Their Comparative 
Evaluation”, Journal of Business Ethics, 16, pp. 1237-1260.  
Reidenberg, J.R. and P.M. Schwartz (1996), Data Privacy Law – A Study of United 
States Data Protection, (Michie, Charlottesville).  
Romer, P. (1990), “Are Non-Convexities Important for Understanding Growth?”, 
American Economic Review, 80 (2), pp. 97-103.  
Schufa Holding AG (2001), Geschäftsbericht 2000, 
http://www.schufa.de/Buttons/geschaeftsbericht.pdf 
Selvanathan, E.A. and D.S. Rao (1994), Index Numbers – A Stochastic Approach (The 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor).  
Senat (1997), Améliorer l’efficacité du Fichier des Incidents de Crédit aux Particuliers 
(FICP), www.senat.fr/rap/r97-060/r97-06023.html 
Smith, J.F. (1977), “The Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974: A Cost/Benefit 
Analysis”, Journal of Finance, 32 (2), pp. 609-622.  
Steyer, A. and J.B. Zimmermann (1998), “On the Frontier: Structural Effects in a 
Diffusion Model based on Influence Matrixes”, in P. Cohendet et al. (eds), The 
Economics of Networks, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 223-243.  
Swire, Peter P. (1996), “The Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act and the Future of 
Electronic Commerce Law”, Electronic Banking Law and Commerce Report, I 
(6), http://www.acs.ohio-state.edu/units/law/swire1/psccrra.htm 
Thomas, L.C. (2000), “A Survey of Credit and Behavioural Scoring: Forecasting 
Financial Risk of Lending to Consumers”, International Journal of Forecasting, 
16, pp. 149-172. 
Turner, M. (2001), The Impact of Data Restrictions on Consumers who Buy Apparel 
from Catalogues and the Internet, Information Services Executive Council 
(ISEC).  NICOLA JENTZSCH 
 56 
US Census Bureau (2000), Economic Census of the United States 1997, Series, 
Washington, D.C. 
US Census Bureau (1995), 1992 Economic Census: 1992 Census of Service Industries, 
Series, www.census.gov/92sc-s-1.pdf  
Varian, H. (1996), “Economics of Personal Privacy”, research paper, UC Berkeley, 
www.sims.berkeley.edu/~hal/Papers/privacy/ 
Von der Lippe, P.M. (2002), Log-change Index Numbers I: Cobb-Douglas and 
Törnqvist-Index, Script, www.vwl.uni-essen.de/dt/stat/dokumente/tes/preb34.pdf  
Waren, W.T. (1993), “Regulating the Credit Reporters”, State Legislatures 19 (4), pp. 
26-29. 
Weber, A. (1986), “Die neue Schufa Klausel”, Die Bank: Zeitschrift für Bankpolitik und 
Bankpraxis, No. 7, pp. 370-374.  
Willinger, M. and A. Ziegelmeyer (1998), “Are informed agents able to Shatter 
Information Cascades in the Lab?”, in Patrick Cohendet et al. (eds), The 
Economics of Networks, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 291-307. 
  57 
ANNEX 
Table A1. Evaluation instrument*  
1. Supervisory authority  
1.1 Existence  Existence means that a supervisory authority is established. Its status 
concerning independence status is irrelevant. 
1.2 Regulatory oversight (credit 
reporting) 
Oversight means that the authority is assigned the enforcement of the act in 
the financial sector or especially for the industry of credit reporting. 
1.3 Issuance of binding guidelines   This requirement means that the authority (or several authorities) has the 
power to draw up regulatory guidelines and administrative measures that are 
mandatory for the companies under supervision of the authority and that are 
enforceable in courts. This point excludes the publication of voluntary 
guidelines. 
1.4 Investigative competences   The authority is allowed to access and inspect data processing activities and 
to collect all information necessary. 
1.5 Legal engagement   The authority has the power to impose sudden or temporary stops of 
supposedly unlawful data processing operations. This point also includes the 
right to engage in legal proceedings (for example to sue) or to refer violations 
to judicial authorities. 
1.6 Disclosure of company list  The authority is obligated to publish or otherwise disclose the list of 
registered/licensed data processors. 
1.7 Regulation of international data 
transmissions 
This point involves the task of an assessment of data exports to other data 
protections regimes and regulations of international data flows. This is 
especially the case where the authority may even interrupt such data flows. 
 
2. Property rights to information  
2.1 Right to opt-in  This point means that the data subject has to give her consent to the 
processing of data concerning her. This is normally done by informing the 
individual about data processing and sharing practices and some schemes via 
contractual clauses. 
2.2 Notice in advance  This requires some formal or informal notice in advance that explains that 
data is collected and that also might contain further details on how data are 
processed and to whom it may be disclosed. 
2.3 Right to access  Here, the data subject is granted the right to approach any company (and 
especially credit bureaus) to ask whether data are processed and to gain 
access to the data about her. 
2.4 Right to stop unlawful data 
processing 
The data subject has the right to completely stop the processing of data, 
when this data processing activity is unlawful as considered by the act. 
2.5 Right to correction  The data subject has the right to rectify data concerning her as far as they are 
incorrect. We have not included any interpretations of how this correction is 
achieved. 
2.6 Right to erasure of incorrect data  This right allows the data subject to approach any data controller and to 
order the complete erasure or destruction of incorrect personal data stored. 
2.7 Right to updated data  We have specified this right to single out the problem that data does not 
necessarily have to be wrong; it just can be outdated. Therefore, the right to 
updated information receives an extra value in our scheme. 
2.8 Blocking rights in disputes   This category includes the right of blocking any data transmission in a 
(ongoing) dispute settlement between the data controller and the data 
subject. A data subject that is allowed to attach a note of correction does not 
stop further transfers of such data. 
2.9 Restrictions on the use of 
sensitive data  
Sensitive data categories generally include racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions, trade union membership, religious and philosophical beliefs and 
also data concerning health and sex life. If these kinds of data categories 
receive further protection, we have denoted 1. 
2.10 Right to depersonalisation and 
the use of a pseudonym 
These measures seem to be a German particularity. The category means that 
data controllers should ensure that personal data are stored anonymously or 
with a pseudonym if possible. 
2.11 Regulation of automated 
decisions  
This regulation provides the data subject the right to object to any decision 
that was obtained by an automated decision-supporting system (as is the case NICOLA JENTZSCH 
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in credit scoring). 
2.12 Right to know score  This is more precise than the indicator 2.12. It constitutes the right of the 
data subject to ask for the specific score achieved in a certain situation. 
2.13 Bankruptcies disclosed ￿ 3 
years 
The longer information can be stored, the weaker data protection might 
become. Therefore, we included the obligation to erase adverse data after 3 
years at the latest. 
2.14 Delinquencies 
disclosed ￿ 3 years  
The same holds for this indicator: if information has to be erased within a 
time frame up to or equal to 3 years, we granted a one. If not due to longer 
storage times, we granted a zero. 
2.15 Judgements, judicial measures  
￿ 3 years  
This indicator follows the logic of the two aforementioned ones. If 
information has to be erased within a time frame up to or equal to 3 years, 
we granted a one. If not due to longer storage times, we granted a zero. 
 
3. Obligations of credit bureaus 
3.1 Mandatory licensing or 
registration  
This includes the mandatory licensing or registration of data processing 
activities that involve personal data. Without the mandatory registration or 
licensing by the authority, personal data processing is considered unlawful. 
3.2 Purpose specification  
 
The purpose specification includes every regulation that establishes the 
obligation to specify the purposes for which data are collected and 
processed. 
3.3 Limits on marketing uses  This point actually belongs to the “purpose specification.” We have singled 
it out to include the fact that some regimes also regulate marketing uses. 
3.4. Restrictions on excessive data 
collection 
Restrictions on excessive data collections do not allow the processing of 
more data than are actually necessary to manage a contract, for example. 
3.5 Prohibition to collect positive 
data 
In some regimes, it is forbidden to collect positive data, that is, data about 
assets and liabilities, guarantees, debt structure, repayment patterns or 
employment status. 
3.6 Disclosure specification   This aspect involves any limits that are posed upon data disclosures to third 
parties. This is typically found as “permissible purposes” of disclosure to 
third persons, although most of theses regulations are very general, we still 
have denoted the value 1. 
3.7 Disclosure of data transmissions 
to third parties 
This regulation obligates credit bureaus to disclose information on data 
transmission to third parties, i.e. other parties than the data subject. The 
information has to be disclosed to the data subject interested in this 
information. 
3.8 Time limits on data disclosure to 
the data subject 
Certain regimes obligate credit bureaus to react to consumer requests within 
certain time frames. If the act regulates this aspect, we denote the value 1. 
3.9 Limits on fees for disclosure to 
data subjects 
If the law determines an upper limit of fees in case of a data disclosure, we 
denote the value 1. If it is forbidden to take a fee, then the upper limit is 0; 
we also denote the value 1. 
3.10 Time limits for dispute 
settlement 
If there are any time limits in the case of a dispute settlement that are 
mandatory for credit bureaus, we also denote the value 1. 
3.11 Information of the data subject 
after modifications 
If the credit bureau is mandated to inform the consumer after a modification 
of the report has taken place (especially after disputes), we denote a value of 
1. 
3.12 Security measures   The data controller (in our case the credit bureau) has to implement special 
security measures to prevent access by unauthorised persons. 
3.13 Time limits for special data 
categories  
This category includes any limits on storage of certain data categories (for 
example convictions or bankruptcies). However, we have also assigned a 
value of 1 where we have found the general form of the allowance of a 
storage “no longer as needed” for that purpose. 
3.14 Information task (of data 
controllers)  
This obligates data controllers to notify other data controllers about data that 
are incorrect but have been transferred to them. 
3.15 Prohibition concerning scoring 
variables  
This indicator is not equal with the aforementioned restrictions on sensitive 
data (2.9). Gender, for example, is generally not labelled as sensitive 
information. However, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act places restriction 
on the use of the variable for scoring purposes. 
3.16 Non-existence of exemptions 
from time limits (3.13) 
This indicator is more difficult to understand. Special data categories have 
to be erased after a certain time limit (3.13), but if there are exemptions (as THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL PRIVACY 
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is the case in the US), data protection is undermined. Therefore, we grant a 
0 if there are exemptions and 1 otherwise. 
 
4. Enforcement possibilities and remedies 
4.1 Penalties of non-registration  This category emphasises the fact that registration may only be enforced via 
the introduction and use of legal powers to achieve a compliance with the 
law on the side of data controllers. 
4.2 Existence of penalties for 
unauthorised receiving of personal 
information 
This category emphasises that there must be an explicit penalty for receiving 
personal information in an unauthorised way (like misrepresenting the own 
identity). 
4.3 Existence of penalties for 
unauthorised storage  
This category emphasises that there must be an explicit penalty for 
unauthorised storage of personal information.  
4.4 Existence of penalties for 
unauthorised communication of 
personal information 
This category states that there must be an explicit penalty for an unlawful 
disclosure of any personal information.  
 
4.5 Existence of penalties for 
communication of incorrect 
information  
This category emphasises that there must be an explicit penalty for the 
knowing communication of false information on the side of credit bureaus or 
information furnishers.  
4.6 Existence of penalties for 
unauthorised data modification  
This category indicates that there are explicit penalties for the unauthorised 
modification of personal information.  
4.7 Existence of penalty in the form 
of a (monetary) fine 
This category further differentiates in stating the kind of penalty received by 
a responsible subject. If there is a penalty in the form of a fine, we denote a 
1. 
4.8 Existence of penalty in the form 
of imprisonment  
Strict regimes should imply that there is also a high penalty in the form of 
imprisonment in case of the infringement of the rights of a data subject.  
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Table A2. Pearson correlation coefficients: The US 
    CI  CCGDP  CCPPC  GDP  FPI  INT  RISK  RS 
CI   Pearson 
Correlation 
1.000  .992**  .988**  .425  .753**  -.423  .789**  .790** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  .000  .000  .168  .005  .171  .002  .002 
CCGDP  Pearson 
Correlation 
.992**  1,000  .987**  .331  .725**  -.361  .795  .777** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000    .000  .293  .008  .249  .002  .003 
CCPPC  Pearson 
Correlation 
.988**  .987**  1,000  .382  .663**  -.367  .785  .703* 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000    .220  .019  .240  .002  .011 
GDP   Pearson 
Correlation 
.425  .331  .382  1,000  .432  -.727**  .125  .390 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.168  .293  .220    .161  .007  .698  .210 
FPI  Pearson 
Correlation 
.753**  .725**  .663**  .432  1,000  -.355  .712  .873** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.005  .008  .019  .161    .257  .009  .000 
INT  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.423  -.361  -.367  -.727**  -.355  1,000  .066  -.559 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.171  .249  .240  .007  .257    .839  .059 
RISK  Pearson 
Correlation 
.789**  .795**  .785**  .125  .712**  .066  1,000  .545 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.002  .002  .002  .698  .009  .839    .067 
RS  Pearson 
Correlation 
.790**  .777**  .703**  .390  .873**  -.559  .545  1,000 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.002  .003  .011  .210  .000  .059  .067   
 OBS. 
(each) 
N  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A3. Pearson correlation coefficients: Germany 
    CI  CCGDP  CCPPC  GDP  FPI  RS  INT  RISK 
CI   Pearson 
Correlation 
1,000  .877**  -.137  -.348  .078  .324  -.348  -.085 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  .000  .672  .268  .809  .304  .267  .792 
CCGDP   Pearson 
Correlation 
.877**  1,000  -.180  -.694*  -.091  .169  -.004  .248 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000    .576  .012  .779  .600  .991  .436 
CCPPC  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.137  -.180  1,000  -.019  .789**  .574  -.312  -.358 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.672  .576    .952  .002  .051  .323  .253 
GDP   Pearson 
Correlation 
-.348  -.694*  -.019  1,000  -.041  -.206  -.199  -.314 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.268  .012  .952    .899  .520  .535  .320 
FPI  Pearson 
Correlation 
.078  -.091  .789**  -.041  1,000  .919**  -.727**  -.744** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.809  .779  .002  .899    .000  .007  .006 
RS  Pearson 
Correlation 
.324  .169  .574  -.206  .919**  1,000  -.823**  -.780** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.304  .600  .051  .520  .000    .001  .003 
INT  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.348  -.004  -.312  -.199  -.727**  -.823**  1,000  .963** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.267  .991  .323  .535  .007  .001    .000 
RISK  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.085  .248  -.358  -.314  -.744**  -.780**  .963**  1,000 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.792  .436  .253  .320  .006  .003  .000   
 OBS. 
(each) 
N  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A4. Pearson correlation coefficients: The UK 
    CI  CCGDP  CCPPC  GDP  FPI  RS  INT  RISK 
CI   Pearson 
Correlation 
1,000  .975**  .965**  .214  .903**  .890**  -.914**  .881** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  .000  .000  .505  .000  .000  .004  .009 
CCGDP  Pearson 
Correlation 
.975**  1,000  .997**  .257  .907**  .899**  -.966**  .938** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000    .000  .420  .000  .000  .000  .002 
CCPPC  Pearson 
Correlation 
.965**  .997**  1,000  .239  .888**  .875**  -.965**  .932** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000    .455  .000  .000  .000  .002 
GDP   Pearson 
Correlation 
.214  .257  .239  1,000  .286  .548  .096  -.335 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.505  .420  .455    .368  .065  .837  .463 
FPI  Pearson 
Correlation 
.903**  .907**  .888**  .286  1,000  .843**  -.895**  .775* 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000  .000  .368    .001  .007  .041 
RS  Pearson 
Correlation 
.890**  .899**  .875**  .548  .843**  1,000  -.872*  .918** 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000  .000  .065  .001    .011  .004 
INT  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.914**  -.966**  -.965**  .096  -.895**  -.872*  1,000  -.844* 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.004  .000  .000  .837  .007  .011    .017 
RISK  Pearson 
Correlation 
.881**  .938**  .932**  -.335  .775*  .918**  -.844*  1,000 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.009  .002  .002  .463  .041  .004  .017   
 OBS. 
(each) 
N  7  7  7  7  7  7  7  7 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A5. Pearson correlation coefficients: France 
    CI  CCGDP  CCPPC  GDP  FPI  RS  INT  RISK 
CI   Pearson 
Correlation 
1,000  .995**  .994**  .720**  -.441  .925**  -.969**  -.125 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
  .000  .000  .008  .152  .000  .000  .699 
CCGDP  Pearson 
Correlation 
.995**  1,000  .992**  .679*  -.443  .936**  -.959**  -.096 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000    .000  .015  .149  .000  .000  .766 
CCPPC  Pearson 
Correlation 
.994**  .992**  1,000  .672*  -.493  .951**  -.978**  -.168 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000    .017  .103  .000  .000  .602 
GDP   Pearson 
Correlation 
.720**  .679*  .672*  1,000  -.333  .449  -.695**  -.072 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.008  .015  .017    .291  .143  .012  .823 
FPI  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.441  -.443  -.493  -.333  1,000  -.502  .605**  .461 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.152  .149  .103  .291    .096  .037  .131 
RS  Pearson 
Correlation 
.925**  .936**  .951**  .449  -.502  1,000  -.935**  -.273 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000  .000  .143  .096    .000  .391 
INT  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.969**  -.959**  -.978**  -.695*  .605*  -.935**  1,000  .342 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000  .000  .012  .037  .000    .277 
RISK  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.125  -.096  -.168  -.072  .461  -.273  .342  1,000 
   Sig. 
(2-tailed) 
.699  .766  .602  .823  .131  .391  .277   
 OBS. 
(each) 
N  12  12  12  12  12  12  12  12 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A6. Cross-country evidence  
    CI  CCGDP  CCPPC  GDP  FPI  INT  RS  RISK 
CI  Pearson 
Correlation 
1,000  .966**  .807**  .314*  -.477**  .236  .585**  .762** 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
  .000  .000  .030  .001  .128  .000  .000 
   N  48  48  48  48  48  43  48  43 
CCGDP  Pearson 
Correlation 
.966**  1,000  .798**  .325*  -.632**  .249  .724**  .778** 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
.000    .000  .024  .000  .107  .000  .000 
   N  48  48  48  48  48  43  48  43 
CCPPC  Pearson 
Correlation 
.807**  .798**  1,000  .273  -.318*  -.002  .445**  .459** 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000    .060  .028  .991  .002  .002 
   N  48  48  48  48  48  43  48  43 
GDP  Pearson 
Correlation 
.314*  .325*  .273  1,000  -.148  -.092  .356*  .283 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
.030  .024  .060    .316  .557  .013  .066 
   N  48  48  48  48  48  43  48  43 
FPI  Pearson 
Correlation 
-.477**  -.632**  -.318*  -.148  1,000  -.401**  -.622**  -.677** 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
.001  .000  .028  .316    .008  .000  .000 
   N  48  48  48  48  48  43  48  43 
INT  Pearson 
Correlation 
.236  .249  -.002  -.092  -.401**  1,000  .141  .664** 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
.128  .107  .991  .557  .008    .366  .000 
   N  43  43  43  43  43  43  43  43 
RS  Pearson 
Correlation 
.585**  .724**  .445**  .356*  -.622**  .141  1,000  .592** 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000  .002  .013  .000  .366    .000 
   N  48  48  48  48  48  43  48  43 
RISK  Pearson 
Correlation 
.762**  .778**  .459**  .283  -.677**  .664**  .592**  1,000 
   Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
.000  .000  .002  .066  .000  .000  .000   
   N  43  43  43  43  43  43  43  43 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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